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Foreword
In 1996, the Economic Transition and Integration Project (ETI) at IIASA initiated a
seminar series on the accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to
the European Union. The title of this series was “The Process of EU Accession:
Preparation by Learning and Exchange.”
This initiative was a logical one, since in recent years ETI has been active in research
and policy advice on the international economic relations of transition economies.
Moreover, ETI’s latest research projects, such as the one on “Output Decline in Eastern
Europe,” and another on “Impediments to Exports in Small Transition Economies,”
have all had strong implications for the CEECs’ integration into the European Union
(EU).
The enlargement of the EU is a complex process whose importance for the countries
concerned can hardly be overestimated. This probably justifies the large number of
ongoing research projects in academia on EU accession. A distinctive feature of ETI’s
seminar series is that it is intended to promote an exchange of views and understanding
among the transition countries aspiring to EU membership. IIASA, with its diverse
composition of members from both parts of Europe (among other countries), including
older and newer members of the EU, as well as the Central and East European (CEE)
candidates for EU membership, seems to be the ideal research institution to enhance
these goals.
The organization of the seminar series is supported by an advisory committee with the
following members: Peter Pomezný, Advisor, Ministry of Finance (Czech Republic);
András Inotai; Coordinator of the Strategic Task Force for European Integration
(Hungary), Danuta Hübner, Head of the Cabinet of the President (Poland); Igor Kosír,
Advisor, Ministry of Agriculture (Slovakia); and Andrej Kumar, Faculty of Economics,
University of Ljubljana (Slovenia).
The first meeting in the seminar series was concerned with the “Strength and
Advantages of Eastern Europe: EU’s Net Gains from Accession,” and was held in
Laxenburg, Austria, in December 1996. That workshop was intended to help make the
CEE applicant countries aware of their strengths and weaknesses in the context of EU
membership and build up their self-confidence before negotiations start. The meeting
had an interdisciplinary character; in addition to issues of purely economic importance,
problems related to the environment, foreign policy, and national security were
discussed. A summary of the workshop can be read on the World Wide Web in an
Interim Report (http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-97-019.pdf).
A second meeting was held in Budapest on December 4-6, 1997, on the “The European
Union and the Rest of the World: Complements or Substitutes for Central and Eastern
Europe?” This paper summarizes that seminar.
vThe underlying idea of the seminar was as follows. In their transition to the market,
most of the smaller CEE countries have oriented themselves toward Western Europe.
This orientation has followed historical tradition and has a clear geographic and
economic rationale. Links to the EU have also become stronger also as a consequence
of the association process itself.
Turning to the EU inevitably means putting less focus on the rest of the world. One can
see a clear tendency toward a decline in the formerly close relations of the applicant
countries with certain groups of countries of the rest of the world (especially with non-
dynamic developing countries, the ex-CMEA countries, and split-partner countries).
With respect to other groups of nations, there is a moderate, far from spectacular,
development in their economic relations. The focus on relations with the EU has been
only slightly moderated recently by such initiatives as furthering the Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) process, development of the pan-European cumulation
process, and the conclusion of numerous bilateral free trade agreements with non-EU
member states.
Accession to the EU will give a further push to the orientation of the current applicant
countries toward Europe. It is necessary to investigate the impact that accession will
have for applicant countries’ relations with the rest of the world, with respect to trade,
flows of capital and labor, research and technology, environment, administration, and
culture. Are there options for the applicant countries among which they can choose and
which they can pursue during the negotiations over accession? Can they benefit from
the potential of the more dynamic parts of the world economy beyond the borders of
Europe? Will the common external tariff, common health and environmental standards,
distribution of structural and cohesion funds, and agricultural transfers enhance only
their relations to the EU members, or will there also be benefits for their interaction with
the rest of the world?
The seminar in Budapest lived up to the expectations of the organizers and the
participants with its substantive presentations, lively debates, and the ample opportunity
it provided for participants from applicant countries and EU members states to build up
new contacts with each other. Participation from CEECs other than the CEFTA
countries was a specific feature of the meeting: presentations and interventions by
experts from the Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Croatia were well accepted and helped
other participants understand these countries’ expectations with respect to the accession
process.
In the initiation and support of this seminar, special role was played by Mats Karlsson,
Secretary of State at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and András Inotai,
Coordinator of the Hungarian Strategic Task Force for European Integration (STFEI).
The meeting was sponsored by these two bodies. IIASA would like to use also this
opportunity to thank for their support.
The success of the seminar was greatly enhanced by two experienced conference
organizers, Anikó Gyorgyovich (Institute of World Economy, Budapest) and Shari
Jandl (IIASA), and by the hospitality of the Hungarian organizers, to all of whom we
are indebted.
This report is structured as follows. The first section summarizes the most recent
developments in the accession process in the individual candidate countries. The second
is devoted to the tasks required by the adjustment to the EU’s common external tariff
vi
and the process of common policy formation within the EU. The following section
analyzes what will happen to the existing close bilateral relations after accession: both
recent Austrian experiences and the expectations of candidate countries, such as Estonia
and Bulgaria, are presented.
The prospects for capital flows originating from outside the EU are investigated in
Section 4, from both the recipients’ and external investors’ points of view. The
following section reports about on the already existing and broadening opportunities for
technological cooperation across EU borders, based on the example of the EUREKA
program. One of the most sensitive issues of the coming EU enlargement is agriculture.
The Polish and Hungarian presentations on the subject discuss the challenges that these
major agricultural producers face as they enter accession negotiations. Section 7
analyzes the core subject matter of the seminar in the broadest perspective: how does
the coming accession fit into the overall process of regionalization and globalization in
historical and economic perspective? The report ends with the summary statements
made at close of the workshop.
1The European Union and
the Rest of the World:
Complements or Substitutes for Central
and Eastern Europe
János Gács and Michael Wyzan
Introduction1
The timing of this workshop is fortunate: half a year after the publication of the Agenda
2000 report and the Amsterdam Summit, and some days before the Luxembourg
summit, it takes place at a qualitatively new stage of development for the candidate
countries. It also promises new developments for EU member states in a number of
critical areas which are important for the future development of the EU from both the
global and European perspectives.
The Eastern enlargement is the first one that takes place in a global framework:
enlargement is no longer a purely intra-European issue. Since CEECs can substantially
contribute to the EU’s competitiveness, it is Europe’s competitiveness in the global
context that is at stake. Unfortunately, to some extent the leaders of the EU member
states, and, even more so, public opinion in many member countries, show little
understanding of this fact. The previous enlargements involved diplomats, policy-
makers, big business, and interest groups, but had little to do with public opinion. Few
people in, say, Germany or the U.K. showed any interest in the enlargement of the
Union with Spain or Portugal in the 1980s.
Today, however, there is an absolutely unjustified preoccupation with and even fear of
the eastern enlargement of the EU in a wide strata of the Western European population.
While there seems to be no opposition to the enlargement at the highest levels of
politics, public opinion holds that enlargement will be harmful, costly, and should not
take place. These opinions are based on fragile arguments at best. Most of the problems
referred to in this context have nothing to do with the enlargement, but have been
inherited from the past. They are consequences of the end of long-time division of
Europe on the one hand, and of domestic rigidities and a failure to adjust in certain
spheres (unemployment, lack of restructuring of the welfare system) in many member
countries on the other.
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 This part summarizes the introductory remarks of András Inotai.
2The CEECs must solve a double problem: to shape accession in such a way that they
can adjust to the requirements of the EU, but also to face global challenges. In most
cases, these requirements can be met in one and the same way, but in others, the scope
and sequencing of the required actions differ. All CEECs are interested in free trade
globally and not in a “Fortress Europe”; the direction that developments will take in the
future remains open. Another question is the extent to which our relations outside the
EU can be positively used in our negotiations with Brussels. Will they be tolerated,
welcomed, and consciously exploited for improving Europe’s competitiveness in the
future or will they pose a problem?
In some areas, Europe seems to lag behind the rest of the developed world, including
new technologies, capital flows, information technology, and social and institutional
flexibility, all of which are necessary for maintaining international competitiveness. We
can only hope that as they adjust their economies to the EU’s requirements, the CEECs
will be doing so with respect to the better and more prospective characteristics of
Europe, and not to those that make EU lag behind the most progressive non-EU
countries.
The CEECs appreciate that intra-European and sub-regional cooperation is necessary in
order to reduce their regional differences, which have deep historical roots. We must
speak frankly about these gaps and devise long-term strategies within the framework of
EU to remedy them. Moreover, the reduction of regional differences is also crucial for
the continent’s security, the most precious benefit of European integration.
1.  Latest Developments in Accession Process: Updates
from Applicant Countries
1.1 Czech Republic2
The account at last year’s workshop3 presented a picture of the Czech economy as a
balanced one. However, at the end of 1997, it is unfortunately impossible to do so.
External imbalance was already present in the Czech Republic in 1994, but by 1997 it
deepened and was complemented with new imbalances: in 1996, the state budget was in
deficit for the first time. This situation was aggravated in May 1997, when there was an
attack on the Czech crown. The era of stability under a fixed exchange rate regime
ended and the country switched to a managed float after an initial devaluation of 10
percent. In 1996, the current account deficit was 7.8 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) and the trade deficit 10 percent, a threat to the economy’s future development.
On November 28, 1997, an open political crisis broke out; paradoxically just at that
point in time economic indicators had just started to improve compared to 1996. In
1997, two economic packages were introduced to remedy imbalances, to cut state
expenditures, speed up privatization, and control the trade deficit. The main topic of
interest at present is the privatization of the four largest commercial banks.
                                                
2
 This section summarizes the presentation of Petr Pomezný.
3
 See Jarko Fidrmuc, “Strength and Advantages of Eastern Europe: EU’s Net Gains from Accession,”
IIASA Interim Report no. IR-97-019, April 1997.
3Earlier, political stability seemed to be an asset in the Czech Republic. As is commonly
seen now, changes of government in Hungary and Poland seem to have borne more fruit
there than stability brought the Czech Republic. Moreover, the necessary political
change is not yet over in the Czech Republic: the coming new government will be a
transitory one, and it will take at least six months to go through the procedure for
achieving a real governmental change through the electoral process. The newly elected
government will likely be a coalition of the social democrats and Christian democrats,
while the two civic parties will undergo a deep crisis which may lead to the break-up of
these parties or to their severe restructuring.
The European Commission’s Opinion on the Czech Republic issued in July 1997 stated
that the country might be apt to join the Union after meeting challenges mainly in the
fields of micro-level restructuring, fostering the banking and financial system, making
progress in such fields as environmental protection, infrastructure, agriculture and
energy, and reforming the state administration.
For the coming negotiations, the problems related to the accession negotiations were
divided to 15 sectors. The necessary position papers have already been prepared and
discussed by the line ministries, as well as by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is
the coordinator of the accession negotiations. It was found that there were discrepancies
between the Czech Republic’s government structures and those required by the
Commission. To eliminate these discrepancies, the new government must carry out a
restructuring of the state administration. The creation of a relatively independent body,
separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to coordinate the negotiations with the
Commission, would be a desirable step.
1.2 Bulgaria4
Bulgaria applied for EU membership at the end of 1995. The Commission’s Opinion
published in July 1997 on Bulgaria suggested that negotiations should begin as soon as
Bulgaria satisfies the criteria of the Copenhagen summit.
We can draw three major conclusions from the Opinion. (1) Bulgaria is on the way to
satisfying the political criteria, namely, stable institutions, guarantees for the rule of law,
and respect for the rights of minorities. (2) With respect to the economic criteria,
progress so far has been limited. In the medium term, Bulgaria will not be able to
comply with the competitive pressures and market forces within the EU. The main
problem areas are the following: weak infrastructure, slow privatization, lack of
structural reform, a high degree of state intervention, and a low level of the foreign
direct investment (FDI) needed for modernizing the economy. (3) As for the ability to
adopt the acquis,5 the Commission expressed a negative opinion, indicating that
Bulgaria will most likely not be able to do so in the medium term. Moreover, a deep
administrative reform will be needed to ensure enforcement of the legislative changes.
Since the Opinions were published in July 1997, considerable progress has been made
in stabilizing Bulgaria’s fragile economy. Since the middle of 1997, Bulgaria has had a
                                                
4 This section summarizes the presentation of Rossen Rozenov.
5
 The “acquis” here and in what follows refers to the acquis communautaire, the body of laws and
regulations necessary to assume the obligations of membership in the political, economic, and monetary
unions.
4currency board. As a result, the exchange rate for the lev has been fixed to the German
mark and confidence has increased in the currency, followed by significant
remonetization of the economy; lev-denominated deposits went up by 38 percent, and
currency in circulation by 80 percent, between July and October 1997. The national
bank’s base interest rate fell from 20 percent to 6 percent per annum. Monthly inflation
in October 1997 was only 0.5 percent. The balance of payments is strong, with
surpluses on both the current and capital accounts. This has allowed that the Bulgarian
National Bank to increase its foreign assets from DM 2.8 billion at the end of July to
DM 4 billion to the end of October.
Despite these developments, there remains much to be done. The Association
Committee met in Sofia at the end of October. It commended Bulgaria’s initial success
in stabilizing its macroeconomy, but encouraged a speeding up reforms, for example,
with respect to reconciling Bulgarian legislation with that of the EU. In a review of the
implementation of the association agreement, it was acknowledged that much of the
agreement had been successfully implemented and that a further liberalization of trade
with the EU can be expected in the future.
1.3 Hungary6
The Commission’s Agenda 2000 project, with its assessment of the candidate countries
was very useful, despite its shortcomings. The differentiation among the countries
reflected a recognition of reality. Since this differentiation was made within a wider
strategic framework, it outlined a general accession strategy for each country. The fact
that the assessment was not based primarily on the macroeconomic features of the
countries, but on their microeconomic and social performance was particularly valuable.
This was the correct way to approach the issue of the adjustment capacity needed for
accession. Another good idea was the linkage drawn between accession and overall
developments within the EU, including reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), Structural Funds, and other EU institutions.
Currently in Hungary preparations are under way in advance of the negotiations
scheduled to start at the end of March 1998. Ministries and inter-ministerial groups, as
well as the coordinators of  working groups the Strategic Task Force for European
Integration (STFEI), have screened the required tasks with respect to the acquis. In the
coming weeks, the general negotiation strategy for negotiations will be formulated and
presented to parliament.
The negotiation guidelines suggested by the STFEI include the recommendation that the
negotiators should set clear priorities, but apply a high level of flexibility, since it
should be assumed that there will be major changes on both sides of the table over the
next few years (i.e., the EU is a moving target). The negotiators’ approach should be
interdisciplinary and interdepartmental, encouraging cooperation between ministries and
institutions.
The year 1997 in Hungary saw sustainable development for the first time, following
several hard years of stop-and-go policies. This time the microeconomic fundamentals
for economic growth of 4-5 percent per year are present. The almost 4 percent growth in
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51997 has been accompanied by a smaller current account deficit than in 1996, with
more or less the same fiscal balance.
Although developments are encouraging, Hungary still badly needs a coherent strategy,
not only to comply with the challenges of the accession, but also to set targets and a
trajectory for the country’s overall modernization. Such a strategy could either be
imposed from abroad (via challenges from the EU) as an integration strategy, or,
preferably, could be established as a general development strategy, of which integration
strategy would be a component.
It is clear that such a general strategy should deal with agriculture, ecology, and regional
development. Complaints about the CAP have been only a pretext for doing nothing;
Hungary must come up with creative policies in the agricultural sphere. In 1996,
parliament adopted a six-year environmental program. It is beneficial that this program
overlaps two government cycles and therefore it will be obligatory for the new
administration expected to be formed in June 1998 to honor it. With respect to regional
development, there have already been institutional changes, including the creation of
Euro-regions or NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) two-level
regions, and the establishment of a medium-term regional policy.
As in the Czech Republic, there is an internal conflict between Hungary’s institutional
set-up and the EU’s requirements. Already in the first months of the next governmental
cycle, a more appropriate institutional pattern of the administration must be created.
Recent years have proved that Hungary’s financial absorption capacity is sufficient.
There are bottlenecks, however, at the institutional level and with respect to the human
factor. These two areas must be substantially upgraded.
The parties to be involved in implementing the integration strategy are not only
politicians and experts but also professional and interest groups. Without actively
involving them in the integration process, it will be difficult to defend Hungarian
interests in Brussels.
Both inside and outside Hungary, public opinion must be informed and educated. The
public must come to understand Hungary’s real interests and the real benefits to EU
members from accession in general, and from Hungary’s joining the EU in particular.
Regional cooperation is highly rated by Hungarian institutions. The STFEI has
organized several regional meetings on topical issues of enlargement and would like to
continue this activity in the future. We hope there will be parties devoted to similar
tasks in other countries which will be interested in taking part in this initiative.
1.4 Lithuania7
Lithuania’s Europe Agreement, after it has been ratified by EU member countries, will
soon come into force. For the management and implementation of polices related to
integration, a governmental Commission on European Integration was set up under the
leadership of the prime minister. In addition, an inter-ministerial delegation for
negotiation on integration was established in early 1997.
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6The Commission’s Opinion distributed in July 1997 stated that Lithuania would not be
in a position to begin negotiations in 1998. Although it satisfied the set of criteria
related to the political system, it would not be able to withstand the competitive forces
within the EU. Notwithstanding the progress made in applying the acquis, there was still
a lot to do and efforts were needed to reform the agricultural, energy, and environmental
spheres.
The Lithuanian authorities were disappointed by the Opinion, claiming that the data that
the Commission used were dated and that the situation has greatly improved in 1997. It
is true that in 1996 GDP grew by 3.6 percent, while in 1997 it is forecast to grow by 5-7
percent. Consumer price inflation fell to 13 percent in 1996 and is expected to be lower
in 1997; the share of trade with EU has stabilized at around 40 percent. In any case, it
would have been impossible for the Commission to examine data more recent than
those for 1996.
In contrast to Bulgaria, in Lithuania a further improvement in the monetary setup will
be the abolishment of a currency board. The main argument here is that prospective
membership in the economic and monetary union makes this necessary: currently, the
litas is pegged to the U.S. dollar (at 4:1). With a view to eventual EU membership, it is
planned that after the abolishment of the currency board, the litas will be pegged to
either the euro or a basket of European currencies.
Slow harmonization of legal norms was one of the targets of the Commission’s
criticisms. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a Harmonization Program, which
included an exhaustive list of the laws and other measures required for integration and
the institutions that those measures implied, along with schedules and priorities. The
latest data indicate that 39 percent of the legislative measures included on the list are
already found in Lithuanian law. Other laws and measures in the pipeline for
parliamentary approval will push this share up to 50 percent; by the end of 2000, the
figure will reach 67 percent. However, one should be careful, in judging progress
according to these statistics alone, since obviously these shares do not reflect the state of
the laws’ implementation, which lags behind their passage.
The main supervisory and coordinator authority for this process is the Ministry of
European Affairs, which was created at the beginning of 1997, and the EU-Legal
Bureau. Currently, the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of European Affairs is unclear. There is evidence of a lack of coordination
between them. Currently the new ministry is finalizing the national strategy for
integration into the EU’s internal market. This strategy has a lot of shortcomings, the
main one being the lack of a coherent vision on the part of the Lithuanian authorities. It
is largely a collection of documents from different ministries and institutions, with no
effort having been expended to make them coherent. Unfortunately, there is as yet no
vision of how to link the overall transition of the Lithuanian economy to the integration
process.
As for informing the general public on EU integration, there have been some positive
developments, for example, in the field of EU-related training. In 1997, the Institute of
International Relations and Political Science started a new masters program in European
Studies. Since the lack of educated civil servants has been a shortcoming in Lithuania, it
is hoped that this program will increase the numbers of experts and qualified civil
servants.
7Discussion of First Four Country Presentations
The discussion focused mostly on the sustainability of Hungary’s growth, which, some
discussants feared, may be relying excessively on investments by fully or partly foreign-
owned companies to boost exports. The Hungarian presenter emphasized that these
investments had been effected already in the post-transformation pattern and they have
been organically and densely linked to domestic activities. For instance, General Motors
has 2,200 subcontractors in Hungary; if each of them employed just five persons, we are
talking about over 100,000 people. As opposed to previous years, when domestic
demand lagged considerably behind exports (due to deep real wage cuts over 1995-96),
in 1997 thee former has recovered somewhat, so future economic growth may not be
primarily export-led.
Other questions were related to the chances for the Czech economy’s recovery from its
current crisis. The Czech presenter stressed that the new government must introduce
several important measures, of which he mentioned two. It will have to give up the
principle of a balanced state budget applied by previous governments, which principle
was at odds with realities of life; an active element must be introduced in the budget.
Second, it must introduce an import surcharge after discussing doing so thoroughly with
the Commission.
1.5 Estonia8
Estonia is among the five CEECs with which the Commission recommended starting
negotiations in 1998. To evaluate the questionnaires must have been difficult for the
Commission, especially because of the dynamism of the transformation process;
nevertheless it managed to do so in a professional manner. The Opinions form a
complex document, a guide for the candidate countries to prioritize the areas that they
need to reform.
The development of the institutions charged with handling accession in Estonia is a
continuous process. At the beginning of 1997, a European Affairs Committee was
formed in the Parliament; it is chaired by the Deputy Speaker and the Head of the
Foreign Affairs Committee. Since then, this committee has developed excellent
relations with the European Parliament and member-country parliaments. Since 1997,
EU integration matters are directly under the control of the prime minister. The 1998
government plan for integration is currently in preparation; it is based on the
Commission’s Opinion. Each relevant minister has prepared a draft plan on
implementing the acquis in the coming years. These plans will be incorporated into a
national work program for the adoption of the acquis.
Estonian officials are looking forward to the Commission’s announcement in early 1998
of an Accession Partnership with Estonia. This document will be based on the Opinion
and its prioritized areas can be regarded as a checklist for integration, which should help
in the construction of the government’s work plan. It is envisaged that the Partnership, if
there is adequate accompanying financial support, will become a useful tool in applicant
countries’ pre-accession strategies.
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8Naturally, not only is the passage of the appropriate laws important, but those laws must
be adequately enforced. Setting up the necessary institutional framework with the
proper competence is costly. For 1998, the government plans to allocate for integration
preparations an amount 3.5 times larger than that in 1997.
We expect that awareness of the EU in Estonia will grow in 1998. Recent public
opinion polls show that support there for EU membership is growing: almost 30 percent
of the urban population indicates that it has the necessary information to formulate an
opinion on accession. But the majority still needs to obtain more information. In 1998,
regional information centers will be established in Estonia’s 15 counties, along with a
centralized EU-Infocenter. These centers will carry out training programs and provide
information services. It is hoped that if sufficient information is available, the public
debate on EU accession will be based on objective information.
1.6 Latvia9
The following focuses only on the economic dimensions of accession.
The Commission’s Opinion on Latvia indicated that, while there has been considerable
economic progress in the country, in the medium term, it would have serious difficulty
coping with the competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Such an
assessment would be valid to a certain extent for all associated countries. While the
Commission’s opinion is broadly correct, the concluding sections were not always
consistent with background provided on the relevant countries; the former were also of
lower quality.
It would be wrong, both technically and methodologically, to forecast a country’s future
potential for catching up based on its achieved level of economic development. It would
be wrong methodologically because convergence should be the output or a byproduct of
integration, rather than a precondition for it. It would be wrong technically because the
unofficial economy is rather large in these countries, so it would not be correct to take
the registered GDP per capita, convert it at purchasing power parity at 1993 prices, and
compare it to the EU average, as was done for Latvia. (1993 prices in Latvia in fact
reflected a big shock in that year.)
One can clearly see the dynamics of Latvia’s economic development: GDP grew by 3
percent in 1996, and 5-7 percent growth is expected for 1997. This growth was
investment-driven and came on the heels of a severe banking crisis in 1995.
Privatization has made much progress, the private sector having reached 62-66 percent
of GDP; the completion of large-scale privatization is expected by mid-1998.
Unemployment continues to be low – at the end of 1997, 6.7 percent – relative to other
transition countries.
In 1996, the flow of FDI surged in Latvia, outpacing that received by its Baltic
neighbors, placing the country in third or fourth place among associated countries. In
terms of stock of FDI Latvia is behind Estonia, but the tendency in growth is
encouraging.
Latvia’s direction of trade reflects a strong orientation toward the EU, with 51 percent
of total exports and 53 percent of imports carried out with EU members. Latvia also
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9looks good according to the Maastricht convergence criteria. Inflation has been
gradually declining, reaching the single-digit level in 1997. The peak level for the fiscal
deficit was the 3 percent of GDP reached in 1993-94; in 1997, a small surplus was
achieved, the first black ink since 1993. In the next two years, the government plans to
run a broadly balanced budget. The gross debt is not excessive either, in 1997
amounting to 15.5 percent of GDP.
There is only one bad sign: the current account deficit is growing, reaching 10 percent
of GDP in the first half of 1997. However, this is not so worrisome, if we take into
account that the capital account shows an increasing inflow of FDI.
Official relations with the Commission give rise to optimism. Recently, we held three
meetings with representatives of the Commission: a subcommittee on the approximation
of laws, a working group on economic and financial issues, and a working group on
financial services. All three concluded that Latvia is on the right track in terms of
economic conditions and legal procedures.
1.7 Slovenia10
Some time ago, the political decision was made in Slovenia that the administration must
do everything possible to steer the country into the first group of countries to start
negotiations on EU membership. Accordingly, in recent years every facet of economic
policy as well as social life has been focused on this end.
In recent years, Slovenia has achieved economic success. Inflation had been reduced to
the single-digit level by 1996 and was maintained there in 1997. Of the Maastricht
convergence criteria, two have already been fulfilled: those on public debt and the
budget deficit. It is hoped that the exchange rate regime for the tolar, which is freely
floating, will converge to European patterns, so that Slovenia will be able to join the
EMU after 2000.
To achieve compatibility in legal regulations, for several years all new legislation has
been examined from the standpoint of its compatibility with its counterparts in the EU.
Quite often, however, parliament has amended laws in such a way as to spoil its
consistency with EU legislation. Nevertheless, the overall development of the legal
system is favorable.
Economic policy has been assisted by research on the preparations for and adjustment to
membership. Since the publication of the White Book, much research has been done
including the latest work, Slovenia’s Strategy for Accession to the EU. This document
summarizes the activities and time schedule that must be followed in the successful
preparation for and conduct of the negotiations. The Strategy was recently accepted by
the government and will be presented to representatives of Commission in Brussels. The
Slovenian parliament will also discuss and adopt it soon.
In recent years, Slovenia has rapidly opened its market with the idea in mind that
business must be prepared for complete integration into the internal market of the EU.
The new tariff schedule introduced in 1996 has meant a substantial reduction in
protection (especially for the manufacturing sector) from an average level of tariffs and
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other charges of 14.6 percent to 10.7 percent. This was a self-imposed liberalization
which is expected to be further accelerated by the implementation of the association
agreement. Under the Interim Trade Agreement, protection was eliminated in 1997 from
40 percent of imports from the EU (measured by import value). Since two-third of
Slovenia’s imports originate in the EU, this signifies a rapid opening up of the domestic
market.
How is this opening reflected in the competitiveness of Slovenian products?
Calculations of revealed comparative advantage (i.e., export/import ratios by sector)
show that the international competitiveness of almost all Slovenian industries declined
between 1992 and 1996. It is shocking that in sectors where Slovenia is thought to have
a comparative advantage, such as the manufacture of furniture, lumber, and wood
products, the drop in competitiveness measured in this manner was very pronounced.
This shows that Slovenia has not been utilizing its comparative advantage.
A comparison of export competitiveness indicators (such as unit labor costs, real wages,
labor productivity, and real exchange rates) for CEFTA member countries shows that in
1993-96 Slovenia’s performance lagged behind the rest of CEFTA, especially in
increasing labor productivity and controlling real wages. This finding defines the tasks
for Slovenian economic policy in the future.
Calculations of another indicator of comparative advantage – whereby the ratio of
Slovenian sectoral exports to world sectoral exports is divided by the ratio of total
Slovenian exports to total world exports – also reveal worrisome tendencies. Over 1992-
95 for one of Slovenia’s most important export sectors (comprising 30 percent of the
total), the production of machinery and transport equipment, the value of this indicator
has continuously been below unity (mostly about 0.8). This means that Slovenia
apparently does not have a comparative advantage in this sector on the world market.
Clearly, the efforts at restructuring have not yet brought sufficient results.
In summary, the Slovenian economy has showed promising results, but during the
accession process there are many areas in which efforts will have to be made to improve
competitiveness. New investments, both indigenous and foreign, must be encouraged.
The government should explore the feasibility of the Spanish example for Slovenia,
namely, to invest into infrastructure before accession, so as to attract FDI.
1.8 Poland11
Poland has a new government as a result of the general elections held in September
1997, one comprised of Solidarity-related parties and the Freedom Union. This new
government faces the prospect of leading Poland to EU membership. Since the senior
official responsible for finance is the father of the Polish economic transition, Leszek
Balcerowicz, there is a guarantee that reforms will continue and even accelerate.
The previous government did not make any serious mistakes in areas related to
accession. Economic indicators show rapid growth in GDP (7 percent is forecast for
1997, as opposed to a planned 5 percent), and investments. Overheating and the
emergence of imbalances is a source of concern. In order to avoid the problems that
other CEECs have faced recently, such as an unsustainable current account deficit, the
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new government would like to slow economic growth. Accordingly, the new budget
proposal includes increases in indirect taxes and a reduction in the rate of wage
increases.
The year 1997 brought a catastrophic flood to Poland, with damage amounting to an
estimated $4 billion. In the midst of this serious problem, it was nice to see solidarity
among the CEECs: relief support arrived not only from our richer neighbors, but also
from Hungary, Bulgaria, and others.
Poland was invited to be in the first group of countries to negotiate over EU accession.
At the end of 1996, the government formed a special Committee for European
Integration, which is coordinating preparatory activities, especially the preparation of a
National Strategy for European Integration. This Strategy was adopted by the
government, presented to parliament, and has already been well received by the
European Commission. In the meantime, the implementation plan for this strategy was
also adopted, including the list of measures needed to solve the tasks that were
presented in the Commission’s Opinion on Poland’s preparations for EU membership.
The major directions that were set up in the Strategy will certainly be followed by the
new government. Each ministry was charged with finalizing its basic documents
concerning its negotiation position by the end of 1997. The biggest problem is adoption
of the acquis. For each country, the Commission will prepare an Accession Partnership
program, and the national program for the adoption of the acquis will be a part of this.
The Polish administration is currently focusing on this program, with the understanding
that a priority area which is not included in this program will certainly not receive
financing from Phare funds. Thus, we are trying to identify what should really be the
priority areas and subsequently to persuade the Commission of the importance of those
areas.
1.9 Slovakia12
When the Slovak Republic was created in 1993, it was generally expected that
independence would help to stabilize the political situation. It was also expected,
however, that due to its inferior economic development, Slovakia’s integration into the
EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be more difficult than it
would have been within the framework of the former Czechoslovakia.
In recent years, Slovakia has achieved surprisingly favorable economic results. In 1996,
the growth of GDP was 6.9 percent, one of the highest among transition countries, while
inflation stabilized at 6 percent, virtually the lowest level among the CEECs. However,
the deficits of the current account (10 percent of GDP in 1996) and of state budget
caused problems for the economic policy in 1996-97.
Despite recording relatively favorable economic results, one could also see increasing
political tensions in the country, mainly along the following three lines. First, the
opposition is not sufficiently represented in parliamentary committees. Second, the
situation of minorities is not ideal, especially with respect to the law on the use of
minority languages. The position of the Roma population also requires more attention
from the authorities. Third, the uses to which the police and secret service have been put
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by the government are grounds for concern. One of the critical remarks in the
Commission’s Opinion was that the role of secret police within the government
structure was undefined and that there was a lack of opposition control over this
institution.
In recent years, the political situation in Slovakia has been increasingly criticized by
various institutions of the EU, the European Council, and the U.S. government. These
concerns constitute a major barrier to the integration of the Slovak Republic into West
European and Atlantic structures, including OECD membership. In the summer of 1997,
the NATO’s Madrid summit decided not to invite Slovakia into the military
organization. The Commission’s Opinion on Slovakia’s application stated the
following: “Slovakia does not fulfill in a sufficient manner the political conditions set
out by the European Council in Copenhagen because of the instability of Slovakia’s
institutions, their lack of rootedness in political life and the shortcomings in the
functioning of its democracy. This situation is so much more regrettable since Slovakia
would satisfy the economic criteria in the medium term and is firmly committed to take
on the acquis, particularly concerning the internal market even if further progress is still
required to ensure the effective application of the acquis.”
The exclusion of Slovakia from the first group of countries with which the Commission
will start negotiations can be seen as a failure of Slovakia’s accession strategy.
However, it has also become clear that the EU has not yet defined its policy towards the
countries that will not be in this first group. This unclear approach is especially
disturbing in the case of Slovakia because the Slovak economy is already intensively
integrated into the broad European market. While the share of Slovak exports to the
EU15 is not particularly high (58 percent of total exports in 1995, not including exports
to the Czech Republic), if we take exports to European countries, including the EU,
EFTA, and all associated countries, Slovakia reaches the second highest export share in
Europe (85 percent of total exports in 1995, including exports to the Czech Republic).
If we take current trade flows and assume that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic join the EU, Slovakia would have the highest share of exports to the single
European market among countries that are not part of that market. Since the structure of
Slovak exports is very similar to those of the other CEECs, the exclusion of Slovakia
from the first wave of Eastern enlargement is likely to result in a high degree of trade
diversion and welfare losses that will make the integration of Slovakia into the EU more
difficult later. Due to its geographical position, Slovakia would be locked into the
enlarged EU (between Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland), but intensive relations
with member states would likely be impeded. This would also apply to cross-border
tourism, due to the Schengen border that would be built up around Slovakia.
In sum, in the long run Slovakia has a sound base for integration into the EU and there
are grounds for optimism. However, controversial political developments are expected
to continue in the short term and, since the coming parliamentary elections are unlikely
to improve the situation, this will also have negative implications in the medium term.
Discussion of Final Five Country Presentations
In the discussion the somewhat rosy picture presented on Estonia’s position was
complemented by a listing of the tasks that the country must meet before accession:
strengthening the administrative structure and capacity, harmonizing legislation,
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improving the natural environment, and furthering the integration of the Russian-
speaking population into Estonian society.
With respect to Bulgaria’s position, it was argued that its current account surplus is not
an achievement, even if recently other CEECs have built up huge deficits. In the
position of transition economies, having moderate deficits financed by capital inflows is
much more desirable, because the CEECs badly need capital from abroad to
complement their meager domestic savings. Capital inflows (accompanied by current
account deficits) is a reflection of expectations of a high return on capital. Moreover, if
an economy is growing, it is a healthy sign to have a current account deficit, provided
that the surplus in imports is not made of overwhelmingly of luxury goods but consists
largely of investment goods, semi-finished goods, and raw materials.
In discussing the presentation on Latvia, it was mentioned that reference to the large
share of GDP produced in the unregistered informal sector is perhaps not a good
argument for Latvia’s superior economic performance, since it could also indicate that
the country is not efficient in applying the regulatory framework of the EU and in
controlling criminal activity. In her answer, the presenter emphasized that not all
unofficial activities are illegal and the reporting of previously unregistered activities is
improving.
In the discussion it was accentuated that improving competitiveness should be an
important element of the integration strategies of the candidate countries, and the
reports on the preparations for EU accession did not devote sufficient attention to this
issue.
In answer to this remark, it was reported that Latvia’s maintenance of a strong currency
had led to a real appreciation, which had had a negative impact on competitiveness.
However, despite opposing estimates by the IMF and the World Bank, the government
still sees the potential for competitiveness with current exchange rate. Substantial FDI
inflows, favorable export performance, the increasing share of capital goods in imports,
and the slow growth of real wages all indicate that competitiveness situation is not so
worrisome as some imply, and it may improve in the future.
It was remarked that the loss of competitiveness by Slovenian manufacturing was
exaggerated by the presenter on that country. The production of machinery is such a
large and heterogeneous sector that Slovenia may have a comparative or competitive
advantage in some sub-sectors thereof (probably those that are not human capital-
intensive), and a comparative/competitive disadvantage in others. Thus, Slovenia’s
overall revealed comparative advantage may show a negative sign but that does not
indicate a lack of competitiveness. In answer to this remark, the presenter pointed to the
strong weight of pharmaceuticals in manufacturing exports and the problems related to
patenting and licensing that this industry is likely to face in its export markets.
In the following phase of the discussion it was questioned whether the Maastricht
criteria are fully relevant for assessing the preparations for accession. The candidate
countries have probably not yet established a proper level of long-term interest rates,
because the region’s financial markets are very unpredictable. Budget deficits are not
necessarily properly measured because several countries still need to put their fiscal
systems in order. Exchange rates are not expected to be stable in the long run either,
because their modification will be needed for improving competitiveness. Thus, EMU
membership is not an immediate task for the candidate countries.
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Several country presenters responded to this remark on the dubious importance of
membership in EMU. In Poland, after some controversy, the established opinion is that
EMU criteria are important for the country, but that Poland should not necessarily meet
them on the first day of its EU membership. Estonia follows the policy of its neighbors,
Finland and Sweden, with respect to convergence to Maastricht criteria: when the time
comes, Estonia will have to be able to fulfill them. For Latvia, fulfilling these criteria is
not an immediate task, but a long-term objective. Reducing interest rates, especially
lending rates, will not be easy, because monetary policy has taken an anti-inflationary
stance. For Slovenia, the EMU criteria are not immediate goals, are especially not worth
following if they lead to increased unemployment. The Maastricht criteria will become
interesting to the country only after 2002, the expected date of membership.
2.  Common External Tariff and Common Commercial
Policy
2.1 Expected Implications of EU Enlargement on Such
Common Policies as Trade Policy13
This presentation is concerned with institutional reform within the EU and how it relates
to the Eastern enlargement. It is based on three papers co-authored by the presenter.
The documents released by the Commission at the Amsterdam Summit suggested that
the five candidate countries would fit into the current union. However, before
enlargement, the EU itself needs to be reformed and discussion of such reforms should
start before enlargement occurs. There are several reasons for initiating reforms within
the EU: usually institutional reforms have been demanded in order to achieve more
efficient institutions. However, there are always arguments for fairness behind
institutional reforms. For example, currently in the Council of Ministers Germany has
one vote for each 8 million citizens, while Finland has one vote for each 1.7 million
citizens.
How would voting relations change with Eastern enlargement? As for efficiency, the
main fear is based on the fact that the CEECs’ population is one-third of that of the EU.
This means that since voting rights in the Council are based on population figures, the
CEECs will have a huge influence on EU policies. This can be illustrated by the
following example. If we take the five CEECs that will start negotiations first, and
assume that they join first, this CEEC5 will get 25 votes in the Council of Ministers,
and the total number of votes will increase from 87 to 112. With current qualified
majority rule, 25 votes may not be sufficient to create a blocking minority, but it is close
to that. The rough probability that the CEEC5 will block any randomly chosen
Commission proposal is 0.9, and this is a worrisome feature for the incumbents.
Therefore, a plan for reform was issued which covers both the qualified majority voting
rule (related to efficiency) and the allocation of votes (fairness).
To analyze fairness, let us start form the current distribution of votes. Germany has ten
votes, each representing 8 million people, while Luxembourg has two votes, each
representing 200,000 people. It is easy to compute the distribution of votes in the
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Council that would lead to a fair distribution of “power.” One can distinguish between
power and voting rates. Power here refers to the probability that a certain country is
crucial for a given decision. Power is not the same thing as the voting rate. In weighted
voting (for instance in a shareholding company), usually the member with the largest
voting rate has the highest power, and vice versa. This fact can seen from Table 1.
Table 1:  Voting Power and Population
Member
State
Share of
Population
Vote
distribution
which leads to
the same power
distribution as
the distribution
of population
(votes)
Vote
distribution
which leads to
the same power
distribution as
the distribution
( percent)
Voting power
when voting
weight is
determined by
the population
(percent)
Germany
UK
France
Italy
Spain
Netherlands
Portugal
Belgium
Greece
Denmark
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Austria
Finland
      0.215
      0.158
      0.158
      0.154
      0.107
      0.040
      0.029
      0.028
      0.027
      0.014
      0.010
      0.001
      0.023
      0.021
      0.014
            79
            60
            60
            58
            42
            16
            12
            12
            12
              6
              4
              1
            10
            10
              6
           19.8
           15.0
           15.0
           14.5
           10.5
             4.0
             3.0
             3.0
             3.0
             1.5
             1.0
             0.3
             2.5
             2.5
             1.5
       24.5
       16.9
       16.8
       16.5
       10.5
         3.4
         2.2
         2.1
         2.1
         1.1
         0.7
         0.1
         1.8
         1.7
         1.0
Source: Alan Kirkman and Mika Widgrén, “Voting in the European Union: European Economic Decision
Making Policy: Progress or Paralysis?” Economic Policy 21 (1995), p. 435.
As the table shows, if we argue that Germany should have more power in the voting
procedure, which should reflect its power as implied by its population, then it would
have 79 votes in the Council, much more than it has today. In fact, in that case,
Germany would command nearly one-fifth of all the votes. There is a straightforward
question: would this kind of allocation be fair? If we take this hypothetical allocation to
be fair, then the CEECs would lose influence relative to what they would have under the
current rules. In the same way, such small countries like Finland and Sweden would
lose votes.
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The presenter argued that an allocation based on population size would not be fair. The
current system is quite fair and the EU does not necessarily need a reform in this
respect.
His reasoning was as follows:  If we take the population figures as the base for vote
distribution within the Council, we would implicitly define the EU as a state. This is
obviously not the case. If we defined the EU as an association of states, at the other
extreme, it would be fair to allocate one vote to each country. It is also certain that the
EU is not an association of states. The EU is something intermediate between a single
state and an association of states.
If we take the distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers as it is now, add the
CEECs and then compute the distribution of power under the current rules, and run a
regression using data for all 25 countries with explanatory variables p and s (where p
stands for the population factor and s for the state factor), we get 79 percent explanatory
power for the EU as a state, and 21 percent for EU as an association of states. This
means that under the current rules we are closer to being a state than an association of
states. Before making progress in deepening integration beyond the current level, there
is no reason to give more weight to the variable representing the importance of the
single state (p).This argument was also discussed in the course of the Amsterdam
Summit.
It is enlightening that if we make the same calculations for the U.S. Congress with its
two chambers taken together, we get 90 percent power for the single state factor and 10
percent for the association of states factor. This means the USA is a bit closer to a pure
state than the EU is.
The conclusion of this exercise is that when the CEECs begin negotiations on their
membership, it would be reasonable for them to argue along these lines. Otherwise,
their interests would be damaged by the coming reform of voting, as would those of
such small current member countries as Sweden and Finland.
Let us now look at relations between the Commission and the European Parliament, and
how they may change after enlargement. The EU has three types of decision-making
procedures: consultation, cooperation, and co-decision. Co-decision’s goal is to give
more power to parliament. If we take these three decision-making procedures and we
take account of so-called “agenda-setting” (i.e., the fact that the Commission has a
monopoly on making proposals), we have the power distributions found in Table 2.
We can see that the Commission’s power index is 0.5 or higher, while those of the other
bodies are very small. Accordingly, the Commission is certainly the main player within
the EU and that is mainly due to its power in agenda-setting. The question is, how will
this change after the enlargement? This is a very complicated topic and there is no space
to do more than mention a few issues.
Just as there are gains from free exchange in international trade, there may be gains
from integration; however, it must be kept in mind that within the EU the Commission
can always manipulate decisions in order to achieve what it wants. There is possibility
of making use of asymmetric information at both sides: also members states can hide
something about their preferences. Then both sides – the Commission and member
states – lose, but there is room (in the game-theoretic sense) for signaling, so it is
profitable for member states to signal to the Commission their true preferences. In such
a case, both will gain.
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Table 2:  Power Indices for EU Organs in Agenda-Setting
Consultation
Commission Council Parliament
Total independence 0.501 0.049 0
Intra-body homogeneity 0.524 0.050 0
Inter-body homogeneity 0.539 0.098 0
Cooperation
Commission Council Parliament
Total independence 0.500 0.003 0.000
Intra-organ homogeneity 0.501 0.014 0.001
Inter-organ homogeneity 0.530 0.059 0.028
Co-decision
Commission Council Parliament
Total independence 0.500 0.003 0.000
Intra-organ homogeneity 0.507 0.014 0.009
Inter-organ homogeneity 0.528 0.055 0.028
Source: Annick Laruelle and Mika Widgrén (1997). “Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games:
The Case of EU Procedures,” (mimeo).
Under current rules, member states may amend a proposal if they do so unanimously,
which means that the likelihood that substantial amendments will be made is fairly
small. Under asymmetric information, this means that the Commission is the main
player.
If we model member states as players in a multi-player game and analyze the
implications of enlargement under a unanimity rule for amendments, we see that
enlargement would actually increase the Commission’s power, with the member states
being the losers. Therefore, it is easy to see why certain member states are not so keen
on expanding the Union and why the Commission is keen on it.
2.2 Common External Tariff and Domestic Adjustment in
CEECs14
The presenter began by stating that he was increasingly taking part in meetings where
András Inotai was the main speaker and where he, Drábek, felt it necessary to keep
Inotai’s optimism under control. Again this time, he tended to be a bit more pessimistic
than Inotai had been in the latter’s introductory talk. This did not mean that he is a
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“Euroskeptic,” but simply that he is an integrationist who takes a critical approach to the
matters at hand.
The presentation covered trade in goods, and within that category, trade in
manufactured goods. The presenter’s skepticism with regard to the coming integration
process is supported by the following three kinds of difficulties.
1. For countries that are currently members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) -
five or six countries among the candidates - the main difficulty of adjustment to the
EU trade system lies in the increasing instability of their commercial policy in the
last few years. First Poland, then Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and
Slovakia), followed by Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, have all asked for
derogations on their commitments to the WTO (mostly in the form of increased
protection through import surcharges). In the case of one or two countries, this has
happened twice. One can explain these requests partly by referring to the fact that
the early speedy trade liberalization in these countries was probably not well thought
through. It can also be explained partly by the fact that, after recovering from their
transformational recessions, severe trade and current account deficits have emerged
due to general macroeconomic imbalances and problems with macroeconomic
policies.
2. In the case of countries that are not WTO members, it would be naive to imagine
that a country could join the EU without first being a member of the WTO. Once
these countries start their negotiations with the EU, it will become clear that WTO
membership is a precondition for progress towards EU membership. It will then
become a problem for these countries that will have to start and finish their
negotiations with the WTO in a short time. Although China is in no way comparable
to the candidate countries, one should recall that that country has been carrying out
accession negotiations with GATT/WTO since 1986.
3. The rest of the talk covered in detail the adoption of the common external tariff by
the candidate countries. The presentation touched upon the following questions: (a)
what is the current degree of integration of candidate countries into the world
economy in the sphere of merchandise trade; (b) what will it mean for these
countries to adopt the common external tariff; (c) are there ways through which their
process will be facilitated; and (d) what are the policy implications of the foregoing?
The degree of integration into the world economy depends on the current level of
protection vis-à-vis external partners and each other. The latter relation is complicated
by the existence of the many bilateral agreements that have come to constitute CEFTA.
These bilateral agreements are not necessarily consistent with one other. What we see in
CEECs is what Bhagwati calls a “spaghetti bowl” of trade agreements. The pattern is
much more transparent with respect to the EU, due to the Europe Agreements, where
the EU insisted on consistency. The irony is that for candidate countries doing business
with the EU is easier than doing business with each other. A third area is the rest of the
world, towards which each of these countries has its own system of tariffs.
But what is the level of these tariffs? The answer is that these tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of
the world are much higher than the EU’s external tariffs, with a few exceptions. (These
exceptions are Estonia, the Czech Republic, and, surprisingly, Bulgaria.) One of the
implications of this fact is that during the accession process the CEECs will have to
adopt the lower tariffs of the EU.
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Will this be an easy process? Table 3 helps to provide the answer to this question: it
shows the difference between the EU’s external most favored nation (MFN) tariff and
the CEECs’ MFN tariff. The rates are divided here between those tariffs that are 25
percent above or higher than the external tariffs of the EU and those that are below that
level, and the unweighted shares of these tariff lines were calculated. In the Czech
Republic, for instance, 28.8 percent of the tariff items fall in the first category. The next
column indicates the share of those tariff items that were 75 percent or more above the
EU’s external tariffs. Again, for the Czech Republic this category showed 6.5 percent.
Anybody in business who learns that the tariff on a product which he produces and
which is subject to fierce international competition must drop by 25 percent will tell you
that he is not very happy: a 25 percent fall is a significant reduction. One can imagine
the tension caused by a 75 percent decline. In fact, the table shows that the Czech
Republic has a comparatively easy task, since the number of items in this category is not
large. But for Hungary, 77.9 percent of tariff lines are in the 25 percent category and 50
percent of tariff lines carry tariffs at least 75 percent higher the EU’s external tariffs.
Poland and Slovakia are doing not much better. At the very least, this indicates that both
the negotiations and the adjustment process are going to be tough ones.
Table 3.  Differences in MFN Tariffs Between CEECs and EU
Percentage of CEECs’ Sectors with MFN Tariffs Higher Than
1.25 times the EU’s MFN tariffs 1.75 times the EU’s MFN tariffs
Founding members of CEFTA
Czech Republic                        28.8                          6.5
Hungary                        77.9                         50.0
Poland                        56.2                         31.5
Slovakia                        53.4                         28.5
Baltic countries
Estonia                         0.0                           0.0
Latvia                       60.3                         42.5
Lithuania                       11.0                           9.6
Other CEECs
Bulgaria                         0.0                           0.0
Romania                       60.3                         32.9
Slovenia                       95.6                         95.9
Source: Zden N'UiEHN   ³&RPPRQ ([WHUQDO 7DULII RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ DQG WKH 6WUXFWXUDO
Adjustment in Central and Eastern Europe: Notes,” WTO, Geneva, (mimeo).
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The next question is whether negotiations would be facilitated if the CEECs pursued
more liberal policies toward one other. A look at the maximum and minimum tariffs
within CEFTA shows that tariffs are highly differentiated, and that this is the case for
every product group. These variations are much higher than those indicated by the
difference between the EU’s maximum and minimum external tariffs. Consequently, the
integration of tariff schedules with the EU’s will hardly be facilitated by the existing
system of trade agreements among the CEECs. In general, the CEECs’ tariffs are
extremely heterogeneous, which in most cases reflects the power of special interest
groups. CEEC governments must deal with them systematically, not one-by-one, if not
on an aggregate basis, by way of some sort of simplification of the whole system.
As for the policy implications of the foregoing, it is sensible to expect a long transition
period for the new EU member countries to carry out the necessary tariff adjustments,
since once the negotiations are concluded, each country would like to become a full
member.
The exchange rate policies of CEECs have in recent years provided these countries with
fluctuating protection levels. Most countries started with undervalued exchange rates,
ensuring protection of domestic production without tampering with tariffs. Following
real appreciations of the currencies, we have seen attempts to use tariffs to provide
protection. While selective tariff protection can not be applied in the candidate countries
in the future (if they take adjustment to the EU practices seriously), returning to the days
of undervalued exchange rates is not a satisfactory alternative either. The countries must
ensure that their exchange rates do not become excessively overvalued and that their
exchange rate regimes remain sufficiently flexible, a recommendation that the Czech
Republic failed to follow until recently.
Tariff adjustment will certainly induce structural adjustment of the real economy. This
can happen only if restructuring takes place in a non-inflationary environment, with low
interest rates and monetary and fiscal policies that ensure lower inflation than we are
witnessing today. Moreover there should be an institutional mechanism in the financial
system to provide the financing necessary for restructuring. Social safety nets which
have been pushed to the side in recent years must be in place to ensure the taking care of
people at a disadvantage.
Discussion of Previous Presentation
It was emphasized that the level of tariffs is as important as the difference in percent
that these tariffs have to make up during their adjustment. If the new external tariff is 4
percent, then a 25 percent tariff reduction from a CEEC tariff means only 1 percentage
point, which is not a problem at all. For manufactured goods these levels for most of the
categories are probably no longer excessive, while for agricultural products tariffs are in
the 100-300 percent range.
It was also emphasized that the dominant share of the candidate countries’ trade is
conducted with the EU, so only a small share of CEEC trade would be affected by
adjustment to the common external tariff.
A warning was voiced that one should not focus only on MFN tariffs. The CEECs offer
MFN status to many countries in the rest of the world, while the EU puts the same
countries in the generalized system of preferences (GSP) category. Accordingly, the
adjustment in tariffs will mean a reclassification from MFN to GSP, a step that may be
more substantial than the adjustment of MFN tariffs.
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The experts from the Baltic states emphasized that while their countries are not yet
WTO members, they could become such as soon as1998. Lithuania has already signed
free trade agreements with almost all CEFTA members and would like to join that
association in the not too distant future.
The question was raised whether the CEFTA countries that do not get into the EU in the
first round will maintain their preferential trade regimes with those that are in that
round. The answer was that they would probably not do so. However, since non-
preferential tariffs are not enormous, that is, they are not on African, Latin American, or
even Asian levels, synchronization of these tariffs would not be difficult. The
adjustment of tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world will be more difficult, since after the
initial liberalization in 1991-92 all countries (with the exception of the former
Czechoslovakia) increased their tariffs against the rest of the world, probably due to a
fear of imports from China, Taiwan, or even Japan.
As for EU’s possible assistance to the tariff adjustments in CEECs, it was stated that the
EU is not in the position to raise its own protection levels in ways that would not
conform to its WTO obligations. It is possible that the EU will slow down any further
liberalization in the next round of WTO negotiations.
3.  Future of Bilateral Relations and Regional
Cooperation/Integration Across EU Lines
3.1 Effects of EU Membership on Austria’s Trade with Non-EU
Countries15
To assess the effects of Austria’s EU membership in the light of theories of economic
integration, we must recall that customs union theory predicts that integration can have
two opposing effects: trade creation and trade diversion. In Austria’s case, direct trade
creation occurred when the trade barriers between Austria and the EU were removed.
Already since 1972, when the free trade agreement between the European Free Trade
Area (EFTA) and the EU was adopted, tariff and non-tariff barriers against industrial
products have been eliminated. Border controls and formalities, arrangements regarding
just-in-time warehouses, and certificates of origin restrained further trade creation, but
all these regulations were themselves abolished in 1995 (the year of Austria’s
accession). It should also be mentioned that in addition to direct trade creation, indirect
trade creation has occurred through increases in GDP, which spur increases in the
demand for imports and encourage trade with third countries.
In the case of Austria’s EU membership, trade diversion and suppression emerged
because of the establishment of a new external customs border, especially vis-à-vis
Switzerland and the CEECs. Unfortunately, no study seems to have investigated these
effects of Austria’s accession. Since the industrial structures of the CEECs and Austria
were rather complementary, the effects must have been rather small.
                                                
15 This section summarizes the presentation of Katharina Helmstedt.
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The dynamic effects of integration are generally expected to be more important than the
static ones. As in many countries, in the case of Austria they exerted their impact
through the economies of scale and subsequent increases in production.
In recent Austrian history, steps toward increasing integration have been followed by
increases in GDP relative to the average of the EU15. For 1960-72, when Austria was
excluded from the EU integration process, trade diversion has been calculated to have
reduced GDP growth by 0.12 percentage points per annum. This loss was three times
higher than the trade creation effect of EFTA membership at that time. In the period
1973-91, however, the association agreement between EFTA and the EU brought the
country about 0.24 percentage points of additional GDP growth per annum.
Additional moves toward integration by the EU which affected Austria were the
creation of the Single Market after 1993 (which is estimated to have cost Austria 0.3
percent of potential GDP) and the start of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994.
This was followed by Austria’s accession to the EU, which is estimated to have added
0.46 percent of GDP per annum compared to the hypothetical case when Austria
remained in the EEA.
Austria’s trade is dominated by intra-industry trade, which at the four-digit level was
about 80 percent of the total in 1996. This type of trade is concentrated on Germany (76
percent of trade with it is of the intra-industry type), while its share is smaller with the
rest of the EU (73 percent). The level of intra-industry trade is smaller but still high with
Visegrád countries (60 percent) and much lower with the other CEECs and the
developing countries. Nevertheless, the share of intra-industry trade has increased over
the past years for all of Austria’s trading partners.
Austria’s trade focuses heavily on neighboring countries, especially Germany. This can
be explained by the gravity model of trade, which predicts that there will be more trade
with closer countries and ones with larger economies and relatively more liberalized
markets.
Since joining the EU, Austria’s trade regime has been adapted to that of the EU and
trade policy has been co-determined at the supranational level. The prevailing GSP as it
is currently operated is much more differentiated than Austria’s GSP was in the past.
Austria’s own GSP, as a rule, used to grant 50 percent reductions in MFN tariffs,
whereas the EU grants, up to a given quota, larger reductions, potentially as high as 100
percent. Another difference appears with respect to the group of preferred countries. For
instance, before accession, Austria granted preferential treatment to South Korea, Hong
Kong, and Thailand, whereas this is not allowed by the EU’s tariff regime. The effect of
this change was that following Austria’s accession its imports from these countries
decreased.
Article 113 of the European Treaty lists those fields where EU members must act in
accordance with each other’s decisions. According to this stipulation, since 1995
Austria has not been allowed to conclude further bilateral agreements on merchandise
trade. For trade in services, the relevant competencies are as yet undecided: The
Commission would like to centralize them so as to achieve stronger negotiating power
vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan. Since the article does not cover investment, Austria
continues to negotiate bilateral investment protection treaties on its own.
Since its accession, Austria has had to apply the preferential and other agreements
concluded by the EU. These include non-reciprocal agreements offering market access
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(for the Lomé Convention countries and former Yugoslavia), preferential agreements
with European partners (EEA with Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland; Europe
Agreements with the CEECs; and the free trade agreement with Switzerland), and free
trade agreements with Mediterranean countries (Tunisia, Morocco, and Israel). As a
consequence, new suppliers have emerged in Austria’s imports, such as North African
countries and former Yugoslav republics.
Improving Austria’s position with respect to cumulation was a major incentive for it to
become a member. Before its accession, Austria and the CEECs were discriminated
against by the EU: semi-manufactures from the CEECs processed in Austria and
subsequently exported to the EU were not granted preferential tariff treatment by the
EU. Similarly unfavorable treatment applied to Austria’s outward procession
arrangements with the CEECs. The damage originating from this treatment was vast:
according to the calculation of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) the
lack of cumulation in manufacturing resulted in a loss of 3.5 percent of exports and 1
percent of GDP. With accession, this problem disappeared: Austria no longer needs a
certificate of origin for commercial operations with the EU.
When reporting on Austria’s direction of trade following accession, one must be
cautious in interpreting the data (especially those for 1995), due to a change in the
statistical recording system for foreign trade that occurred simultaneously with
membership. After accession, trade with the EU picked up, growing much faster than
Austria’s total trade (for exports, 15.0 percent and 13.2 percent, respectively; for
imports, 12.1 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively). However, the economic downturn
of 1996 halted this process. In 1996, the EU’s share of Austria’s exports was 64 percent,
and its share of Austria’s imports was 71 percent. The largest trade partners are
Germany (accounting for about 40 percent of exports and imports), Italy (8-9 percent),
and Switzerland (4-6 percent).
Since the removal of the iron curtain, there has been an exceptionally large shift in
Austria’s trade structure toward trade with CEECs. The larger the distance from a
country to Austria the less intense is bilateral trade. Neighboring countries make up
about two-thirds of total trade with the region. Austria is the leading country in the EU
as far the percentage of trade conducted with the Central and Eastern European region is
concerned.
Austria’s trade surplus with the region increased from 7.4 billion schillings in 1989 to
23 billion schillings in 1996. This growth was achieved especially in trade with
Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, and the Czech Republic.
Many CEECs are currently making efforts to reduce their large current account deficits,
a tendency that may negatively affect Austria’s exports in the near future. For instance,
Hungary’s stabilization measures of 1995 reduced Austria’s export growth with that
country from 20 percent in 1994 to 5.3 percent in 1995. Similar developments can be
expected vis-à-vis Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Poland.
In conclusion, one should warn that it is not easy to qualify the effects of EU
membership on Austria’s economy, partly due to unreliable trade statistics. The trade
effects of such membership were recorded mostly on the import side and were caused
largely by the changeover to a new GSP system. The two main events of the 1990s for
Austria’s trade were accession and the opening up of the Central and East European
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region. However, neither occurrence was sufficient to cause the export/GDP ratio to rise
above its long-standing value of 40 percent.
Nonetheless, after the fall of communism, trade – especially exports to the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland – increased substantially and this tendency
has not been modified by Austria’s accession to the EU. Links to EFTA countries,
especially Switzerland, have become less intense. As for overseas countries, exports
have remained on previous levels, while imports have decreased, especially from Japan.
Discussion of Previous Paper
In response to a question, the presenter explained that the drop in Austria’s imports
from Japan has occurred because earlier Austria had had a special system for
encouraging certain imports from Japan, which it was forced to phase out after 1995.
According to that system, Japanese cars entered Austria duty-free if the Japanese
producers imported a certain amount of semi-finished products from Austria which
were used for the production of those cars.
As for the drop in imports from the Asian Tigers, the explanation lies in the changes in
the GSP: Austria had granted them a 50 percent reduction on MFN tariffs before
membership, and this too had to be eliminated after accession.
As a comparison, Sweden’s experience was recalled. Since accession Swedish trade
with the other members of the EU has changed remarkably little. Major shifts were
experienced, however, in trade with Asian countries: Swedish exports has grown and
imports decreased with these partners. The surge in exports occurred largely in those
types of products where distance is less relevant, namely telecommunications products
and to a lesser extent in pharmaceuticals.
3.2 Future of Regional Integration Across EU Lines: Estonian
Perspective16
Three cooperation frameworks have been established in the Baltic-Nordic region: (i) the
Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM); (ii) so-called 5+3 Cooperation between Nordic and
Baltic countries, and (iii) the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS).
(i) The main objective of the BCM is to assure the security and economic prosperity of
all the people of the region. The Baltic countries have set their goals within the context
of European and North Atlantic economic and security. Baltic cooperation is considered
part of a wider security strategy, and should be consistent with the goal of integration
into the EU. Since the harmonization of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian legislation
with their EU counterparts is an EU membership criteria, such harmonization will also
lead to a harmonization of the economic relations among the Baltic states. Accordingly,
Baltic cooperation is very important during the phase of preparation for membership.
This organization’s priority areas include the following: economic and security issues,
sea transportation, energy, and crime prevention. Complementary to the already existing
free trade area among the three economies, a common Baltic transit procedure is
planned. In addition, the three countries are finalizing the establishment of joint border
crossing checkpoints in order to enhance cross border flows of people and goods. They
                                                
16 This section summarizes the presentation of Katrin Kanarik.
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are also negotiating over opening their markets to trade in services (including financial
services and telecommunications), although the implementation of such a step would
require enhancement of the efficiency and competitiveness of the providers of these
services.
The three nations are determined to introduce the four freedoms into the Baltic area
according to the pattern of EU.
The Estonian governments considers the Baltic cooperation to be of strategic
importance. This view was already expressed immediately after regaining
independence, rather than by such external forces as the Madrid or Amsterdam meetings
of the European Council. Since independence, a series of structures have been created to
institutionalize cooperation among the parliaments, heads of states, and governmental
structures in the region. In the course of this, the Baltic states have taken inspiration
from their Nordic neighbors. There are more than 20 committees composed of senior
officials within the framework of the BCM. It is expected that in the future these
mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation will acquire a more concrete and
practical content.
In Estonia the following are the priority areas of the cooperation:
1. consolidation and further elaboration of the Baltic Free Trade Area. On
November 20, 1997, agreements were signed which abolished non-tariff
barriers;
2. improvement of transit, including the improvement of infrastructure and the
introduction of unified procedures for international cargo transit;
3. improvement of cooperation in strengthening the external border of Baltic states
(this is also a precondition for EU membership);
4. cooperation in defense and security (this has already been one of the more
successful areas of cooperation); and
5. crime prevention, environmental, and judicial affairs.
(ii) Nordic cooperation is based on shared history, geographical location, and linguistic
relationships, as well as on similar social structures. Based on the principles of the
Helsinki treaty of 1962, there are various institutions, including the Nordic Council (a
parliamentary forum founded in 1952), and the Nordic Council of Ministers (established
in 1971). Nordic cooperation has three pillars: cooperation within the Nordic region;
with EU and EEA; and with adjacent regions (such as the Karelia, Leningrad,
Murmansk, and Kaliningrad oblasts of Russia).
For adjacent areas, programs and projects have been devised in various policy areas
with the support of the Nordic countries. The main themes of the concrete programs are
as follows: culture, education, research, environmental protection, social and health
affairs, transport, telecommunication, harmonization of legislation, border guarding,
customs, migration, and crime prevention.
From the Estonian viewpoint, the working out of an adjacent areas program for the
Nordic and Baltic countries would promote regional 5+3 cooperation. It is envisaged
that cooperation among equal members would grow out of such a program. It is
important to develop cooperation in EU-related areas and to diversify the focus of
cooperation beyond the capital cities to include rural areas.
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(iii) The members of the CBSS include the countries participating in Nordic 5+3
Cooperation, along with Russia, Poland, Germany, and the European Commission. The
CBSS was established in Copenhagen in 1992. Several areas for common action were
identified, all of them related to the stability and well-being of the region as a whole.
These areas include the following: assistance to democratic institutions; economic and
technical cooperation; humanitarian matters and health; environmental protection and
energy; cooperation in culture, tourism, and information services; and transport and
communication.
Three working groups have been established in the first two of these areas, as well as in
nuclear and radiation safety. In the last of these instances, information is collected on
nuclear and waste-storage facilities in the Baltic region, with special emphasis placed on
sites that require immediate action in order to reduce the risk to the general public and
environment.
From the Estonian point of view, the CBSS should concentrate primarily on economic
cooperation, including the development of infrastructure, investment, production, and
trade. Cooperation in the field of research into and the development of high and middle
level technology would improve the Baltic states’ competitiveness vis-à-vis the
developed world.
In addition to the three aforementioned cooperative institutions, Finland has initiated a
new one, known as the “Northern Dimension of the EU.” This initiative aims at
strengthening the role of the EU in the EU’s northern region within the framework of
the EU’s external policy. It would cover the Baltic and Barents Sea regions, and would
treat them similarly to other Euro-Atlantic regions. It is envisaged that this initiative
would explore the advantages that the northern region can offer Europe. Estonia has
welcomed this proposal and is interested in its development especially as regards
transport and energy networks.
From Estonia’s point of view, the continuation of regional cooperation and integration
is of utmost importance. It is not an alternative but a support to linking processes in the
Baltic region to wider European integration.
Discussion of Previous Paper
A question was raised concerning the fate of the proposal for a Baltic customs union
that floated around for a number of years in the Baltic capitals. The presenter explained
that the customs union was still popular among politicians, but experts were reserved
about it, due to its perceived inefficiency and the message that it would send to the EU
on regional developments which are distinct from integration with the EU. A couple of
years ago, the three Baltic prime ministers signed an agreement on the intention to
elaborate a Baltic customs union, which would have begun in January 1998. Currently,
this initiative is completely unrealistic: the administrations speak about establishing a
common transit procedure, rather than a customs union.
A question was raised as to whether the Baltic region may be replicating developments
in the Nordic region, whereby some countries joined the EU, while others remained
outside of it. In the Nordic region, this happened due to the countries’ own decision,
while in the Baltic case, if this occurs, it will be against the will of the nations involved.
The presenter acknowledged that the Baltic countries can learn from their Nordic
partners how to cooperate while having one’s own priorities and belonging to different
regional groupings. The Baltic countries have similar histories and goals – accession to
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the EU, NATO, and the OECD – and will probably follow the same road, although
perhaps at different times.
The European Commission’s distinction between first round and second round countries
has engendered bitterness in the Baltic region, but more so among politicians than
among civil servants and scholars. The distinction between Estonia, on the one hand,
and Latvia and Lithuania, on the other, will probably not alienate the latter two
excessively, as it may do in the cases of Slovakia and Romania. As for the Baltics, there
is the common view that at least one of them should join in the first round and that
eventually all should join.
In a comment, it was mentioned that the trade structures and the comparative
advantages of the Baltic states (as evidenced by Balassa indices) are quite narrow and
that there was not much change in this respect between 1992 and 1996. This may be
worrisome for the Baltic states when they join the EU, since their exports are limited to
certain sectors, some of which have no real comparative advantage compared with other
EU members. Lithuania, for instance, exports – or rather re-exports from Russia –
mainly minerals to the EU, along with textiles in the framework of outward-processing
based in Italy, and wood and wood products produced from indigenous materials. This
structure has hardly changed in the past five years. It is not clear whether this export
structure will continue to reflect the country’s comparative advantages after real wages
there catch up.
It was also mentioned that Latvia’s position with respect to exports to the EU is similar
(exporting wood products, textiles, and chemicals), but that there is hope that FDI will sustain
the already emerging tendency for growth in the share of higher value-added products. The
structure of Estonian exports is similar (timber, textile, and equipment), and the government
there hopes that cooperation will be intensified in high and middle level technology, such as in
the production of mobile phones.
3.3 Trade and Development If Some CEFTA Countries Become
EU Members Before Bulgaria’s It Does17
In recent years, Bulgaria’s trade with CEFTA has been much smaller than its trade with
the EU. In January-September 1997, 43 percent of Bulgaria’s exports went to the EU
and only 3 percent to CEFTA, while the respective shares for imports were 37 percent
and 6 percent. Since 1992, Bulgaria’s trade with CEFTA has been in deficit.
As of December 1997, Bulgaria has yet to join CEFTA, but it has signed free trade
agreements with three of its members (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and
it is about to do so with the other three (Poland, Hungary, and Romania). Until recently,
outstanding debt to Poland and Hungary, inherited from the period of central planning,
stalled the signature of free-trade agreements with CEFTA countries, but according to
the latest information, these debts have been cleared or will be cleared shortly. Bulgaria
is expected to become a CEFTA member in 1998, after which it will probably enjoy
several years of free trade within this framework, before several CEFTA members join
the EU.
                                                
17 This section summarizes the presentation of Rossen Rozenov.
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As for trade with the EU, the best year was 1995 – the year in which overall trade
performance of Bulgaria was the strongest – when both exports and imports with EU
partners surpassed $2 billion. In 1996, due to macroeconomic instability, trade with the
EU declined; according to Bulgarian statistics, it enjoyed a surplus with the EU. The
first nine months of 1997 have brought increasing trade volumes and another surplus
with the EU.
With respect to the commodity composition of Bulgaria’s exports to CEFTA (based on
the sections of the Harmonized System of Commodity Description and Coding) the
leading export items are chemical products (mainly fertilizers), base metals, while the
major import items are vegetable products, textiles, chemical products and machinery.
To understand what can be expected to happen to Bulgaria’s trade with CEFTA
countries after several CEFTA members join the EU, one has to apply the theory of
discriminatory trade policies. We must assess the extent of the trade diversion that will
occur on EU markets at the expense of trade with Bulgaria. Another question is, how
much displacement of Bulgarian trade will occur on the markets of the new member
countries? However, this is of negligible concern, due to the low level of trade with
those countries (3 percent of Bulgarian exports) and to the fact CEFTA trade with the
EU (for those CEFTA countries without free trade agreements with Bulgaria) is already
more liberal than that with Bulgaria.
In order to assess the extent of possible trade diversion, we need information on the
elasticities of the supply curves of the countries concerned (CEFTA and Bulgaria) and
the elasticity of import demand in the EU for imports from Bulgaria and the CEFTA
countries. Data limitations prevented the presenter from carrying out such an exercise.
We may expect, however, that there will be some trade diversion, its extent depending
on the structure of Bulgaria’s and CEFTA’s exports to the EU. The larger the overlap
between these structures, the more trade diversion is to be expected.
How can Bulgaria handle this issue, if trade diversion will be excessive? First, Bulgaria
can negotiate concessions from the EU. This happened already in connection with the
latest EU enlargement, when Bulgaria managed to achieve larger preferential tariff
quotas, although until now it has not been able to fulfill those quotas. The main causes
of the under-utilization of quotas have been the poor state of the agricultural sector
(including problems with land restitution and the unfavorable pricing of the agricultural
products), a lack of information on the quotas, and the complicated procedures for
distributing the quotas within the country.
Another means to fight trade diversion is raising the competitiveness of Bulgarian
products. Bulgaria probably has the worst labor productivity record in Europe, due to
the delays in its structural reforms. It is a miracle that Bulgaria is still able to export
anything at all. Most state-owned enterprises are known to be selling at a loss: statistics
show that aggregate after-tax profitability was negative for most sectors over 1992-96.
These losses were reflected in the accumulation of bad loans in the banking system;
they were eventually covered indirectly by the state budget. The previous (socialist)
government passed a law guaranteeing 100 percent of the value of the bank deposits of
individuals and 50 percent of those of enterprises. This meant that, when a series of
bank failures hit Bulgaria in 1996, the government itself eventually took on all the debt.
As we see, without sound structural reform, Bulgaria’s prospects for attaining
international competitiveness will not improve. It has a trade surplus, but that is not
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necessarily good news. It is more the result of a sharp decline in imports than of rising
exports. Imports fell by almost 8 percent in 1997, after hyperinflation and exchange rate
depreciation hit the country.
One can expect that in 1998 and thereafter the country will face serious problems with
its current account, not only due to real appreciation, but also to the effects of the further
liberalization of trade with the EU. Trade liberalization in general and in the long run is
beneficial but its short- or medium-term consequences must also be taken into account.
When, for example, Greece joined the EU in 1981, its current account deficit increased
considerably. Likewise, once Bulgaria achieves free trade with the EU, its current
account will surely be in deficit for quite some time.
Discussion of Previous Paper
To a question asking whether one reason for excessive enterprise losses was not due to
their underreporting of exports, Rozenov answered that state enterprises, as a rule, do
not care whether they pay taxes or not. In any case, trade data comes from balance
sheets submitted to the statistical office and not from those filed with the tax authorities.
A question was raised concerning what privatization would mean for export
competitiveness, when there are so many negative value-added activities. The presenter
explained that privatization for companies like the big metallurgical complex at
Kremikovtsi would inevitably lead to the closing down of numerous parts of the
company engaged in unprofitable activities. The structure of trade, however, can not be
changed radically and immediately, since Bulgaria’s productive capacity is largely in
metallurgy and chemistry, so time is needed to change the structure of industry.
4.  FDI:  Impact of Enlargement on Investment from
Non-EU Countries
4.1 Prospects for FDI in Countries Joining NATO and EU18
The question in the title is very straightforward, but it is not easy to answer it in an
equally straightforward way. This especially holds for the influence of NATO
membership, which largely escapes analysis based on economic theory.
NATO and EU reflect, by their nature, aims, purposes, mechanisms of functioning very
different types of alliances. In this context, the following two questions arise:
1. how important is political instability and risk in a host country to a foreign
investor’s decision to invest; in our case, this applies to non-EU investors, what
basically means those from the U.S. and Japan and
2. what is the impact of the economic and political integration process on a foreign
investor’s decision (again, in our case, for investors from outside the integration
area) to invest in a member country of an integration scheme? Here, reducing
political instability and risk is only one of the elements, and definitely not the
most important one, provided by integration.
                                                
18
 This section summarizes the presentation of Matija Rojec based on his paper “Foreign Direct
Investment – How Much Does NATO and EU Membership Enhance Investments by Non-EU Investors?”
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Data indicate that FDI inflows to the CEECs are increasing rapidly in absolute terms, as
well as with respect to their shares in worldwide FDI inflows. Starting from a level of
virtually zero, annual inflows to the CEECs reached $12 billion in 1995, 3.8 percent of
world FDI that year. Among investing countries, Germany is the leader, followed by the
U.S., Austria, the Netherlands and France (this applies to the CEEC 7, i.e., the CEFTA
countries plus Bulgaria). The U.S. and Switzerland are the only significant non-EU
investors in the CEECs. Japanese investors are present, but their overall engagement in
the region is still low.
NATO membership can contribute to the attractiveness of a member country as a host
for FDI by reducing the country’s (perceived) political instability and risk in the eyes of
foreign investors. Therefore, the real issue with respect to NATO membership and FDI
inflows is the importance of a host country’s political instability and riskiness for the
investment decision of investor from outside the EU.
Theory suggests that uncertainty in the form of political volatility adversely affects the
economic viability of a firm’s present or future value-adding activity, likely leading to a
low level of FDI. Various country-risk analysts (such as those of Euromoney, The
Institutional Investor, Frost and Sullivan, and so on) attach considerable importance to
the political risk. For instance, Euromoney assigns a weight to political risk within total
risk of 25 percent, the same as its weight on economic performance.
However, the results of research on the impact of political instability and risk on FDI
inflows are ambiguous. In 1993, John Dunning, a prominent expert on FDI, carried out
a comprehensive overview of empirical studies on the influence of political instability
and risk on FDI. He found that early field studies all suggested that political risk ranked
very high among the variables taken into consideration by multinational enterprises
(MNEs) in determining the location of their overseas operations. However, later
statistical studies which have embraced political environment indicators have yielded
more ambiguous results. (As a rule, these analysis studied the influence of political
volatility on U.S. investors, which increases the relevance of their findings for our
topic.)
In sum, empirical analysis suggests the following:
1. political instability and risk are important for foreign investors when they
consider their locational decisions, but their importance varies in time and across
countries, with the developing countries being under tighter scrutiny;
2. foreign investors are especially adverse to drastic types of unfavorable
international or domestic events, which are especially likely to occur in less
developed countries; and
3. on the other hand, for a good investment opportunity, foreign investors seem
prepared to take on a fair amount of political instability and risk.
The only empirical example of NATO’s influence on FDI inflows occurred when Spain
joined NATO in 1982; all the other member countries joined NATO before the mid-
1950s, when the role of FDI in international economic relations was still rather weak.
Data show that FDI inflows into Spain did not really increase after 1982, either in
absolute terms or as a share of FDI inflows to OECD countries. Neither did the share of
Spain in the U.S.’s FDI outflows or stock increase after 1982, although in the case of
Japan there was a slight increase. All this hardly provides a basis for the conclusion that
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NATO membership plays a positive role in enhancing inward FDI in general, or that
from non–EU countries in particular.
It is too early to analyze the affects of the Czech Republic’s, Hungary’s, and Poland’s
joining NATO on inward FDI flows to these countries. A possible illustration is
Euromoney’s assessment of political risk. In all three countries, political risk in the
period March-September 1997, during which they were invited to join NATO, actually
deteriorated. However, according to that magazine, political risk in comparable
countries not invited to join NATO (Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) worsened to an
even greater extent.
All in all, the existing – rather fragmentary and poor – data do not support the idea that
NATO membership will be a significant enhancing factor for inward FDI to prospective
NATO members. However, taking into account that it is mostly drastic types of political
instability and not “reasonable” such instability which diverts foreign investment, one
should not expect that the ability of these fairly stable countries to attract such
investment will be significantly improved by joining NATO.
The question of the role of EU membership in enhancing FDI, in particular for investors
from non–EU countries, is largely the same as the issue of the impact of regional
economic integration on FDI in general, and on FDI inflows from outside the region in
particular. According to Dunning, one should distinguish between the primary (or
initial) effects and the secondary (or consequential) effects of economic integration
processes on FDI.
The primary effects occur because integration: (i) makes, ceteris paribus, intra-regional
trade more attractive than extra-regional trade, which stimulates MNEs from outside to
replace their exports to the integrated area with FDI; and (ii) creates a new configuration
of locational advantages, which forces MNEs to adjust their pre-existing investments in
the region to reflect enlarged free intra-regional trade. In the first case, FDI inflows in
the region will increase, while in the second, for the region as a whole FDI gains by
some countries will be offset by FDI losses by others.
However, the secondary effects of integration are likely to be of greater importance in
the long run. These effects arise from both the restructuring of activities between
countries, sectors, and firms within the enlarged integrated area, and from new
opportunities for firms to increase their technical and scale efficiencies by reducing
production and transaction costs. These secondary effects will lead to increased FDI in
regionally based affiliates and to increased sourcing by MNEs in the region.
The EU represents probably the most widely studied case of the effects of integration on
FDI and the data on it strongly support the theoretical premises provided above.
Integration processes within the EU have represented an important incentive for intra-
and extra-EU FDI flows, and have also resulted in certain specific structural
characteristics of FDI in the region. There was a radical increase in FDI flows between
1985 and the end of 1992, a period marked by the adjustments of MNEs to the needs of
the coming internal market. The announcement of the internal market in 1985
compelled both investors from outside and especially those from within the EU, to
radically intensify their investment activity in the region. It was in the first place MNEs
from the EU which tried to take advantage of the forthcoming deepening of integration.
The major vehicle in this regard was merger and acquisition activity.
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In addition to intra-EU FDI, major non-EU investors, namely, those from the U.S. and
Japan, also significantly increased the shares of their total FDI directed to the EU. Thus,
in 1982–91 the share of the EU-12 in the total U.S. outward FDI stock increased from
35.8 percent to 41.9 percent, while the respective figure for Japan rose even more, from
6.7 to 17.6 percent. The increased activity of U.S. and Japanese investors in the EU was
far from equally distributed among the EU countries, with by far the largest recipient
being the U.K.
The major impetus given to FDI by the internal market scheme points to the relevance
of different stages of integration for FDI flows: the deeper the integration, the more
important are the effects on FDI flows, and even more so on the character and structural
characteristics of MNE’s activities. The following effects of the EU’s internal market on
FDI, as put forward by John Cantwell, seem especially relevant:
1. While, in the early stages of EU integration MNEs competed with each other so
as to serve one another’s domestic markets either through FDI or trade, in the
internal market era, regional corporate networks and alliances of MNEs of
varying national origin have been built to serve the whole EU market.
2. For most MNEs, integration has become increasingly intra-EU, at the expense of
inter-regional integration. Corporate networks have normally been constituted at
the regional level, integrating affiliates located within the EU. Consequently,
MNE trade and specialization is developing fastest within the EU. Since similar
processes are under way in the U.S. and Japan, the international integration of
affiliate networks has essentially involved a process of regionalization and
development of regional strategies.
Of special interest here is the behavior of FDI inflows to countries once they joined the
EU. The accession of Greece to the EU in 1982 did not result in an immediate increase
in FDI inflows to the country. FDI inflows to Greece began to increase in 1987,
coinciding with the general trend of strong increases in FDI inflows within the EU as
the internal market approached.
On the other hand, for Portugal and Spain, joining the EU in 1986 represented a turning
point in these two countries’ inward FDI. Inflows to Portugal and Spain increased after
1986 not only in absolute terms but also as shares of worldwide flows and as shares of
FDI inflows within the EU (see Table 4). The U.S. and Japan also began to see these
countries as more attractive locations for FDI. In 1986–91, the share of Spain in the
total U.S. outward FDI stock increased from 1.0 to 1.7 percent, and that of Portugal
from 0.11 to 0.20 percent.
The lessons of past experience with respect to the impact of EU integration on FDI
inflows from non-EU countries are as follows:
1. the accession of the CEECs to the EU will increase FDI inflows to the new
member countries. This increase will come in the first place from other member
countries, but also from non-member countries. EU membership will probably
increase both the absolute and relative attractiveness of the CEECs as
investment sites for EU and non–EU investors;
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Table 4:  Shares of EU-12, Spain, Portugal, and Greece in Total FDI Inward Flows to
OECD Countries, 1981–91 (in percent, where OECD = 100%)
       EC-12        Spain      Portugal        Greece
1981          37.5          4.18          0.43           1.27
1982          44.1          5.92          0.48           1.43
1983          46.1          5.34          0.49           1.42
1984          20.5          4.96          0.55           1.36
1985          38.2          5.26          0.74           1.21
1986          29.7          5.31          0.37           0.73
1987          33.7          4.19          0.43           0.63
1988          43.2          5.49          0.72           0.71
1989          46.9          5.28          1.09           0.47
1990          54.6          8.70          1.66           0.64
1991          66.6        10.27          2.42           1.12
Source: OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1993.
2. the major effect of the CEECs’ membership in the EU will be a change in the
attractiveness of intra-regional versus extra-regional trade. This will encourage
MNEs from outside the EU to replace exports with FDI and production by the
local affiliates benefiting from such investment. In this regard, one should not
forget that the ten CEECs already have Europe Agreements, which imply a
significant degree of integration with the EU. The major question here for MNEs
is, in what ways does full EU membership offer more than the Europe
Agreements with respect to FDI? The answer is that the internal market has had
a strong enhancing effect on intra- and extra-FDI inflows in the EU, and only
full membership can make the CEECs participants in the internal market;
3. the effect of accession on FDI inflows will not be the same for all new member
countries. Non–EU investors, in particular the U.S. and Japan, show a preference
for such larger countries as Poland;.
4. The CEECs’ EU membership will attract non–EU FDI intended to supply the
EU market from the new member countries. However, it may also happen that
some U.S. and Japanese MNEs will increasingly use their existing springboards
elsewhere in the EU, in particular in the U.K., to service the new members’
markets. This phenomenon may offset to a certain extent the positive influence
of EU membership on FDI inflows to the CEECs from non–EU countries;
5. The CEECs’ EU membership may bring about some reorganization of MNEs in
the EU, and of the FDI made by those MNEs, in view of the relative competitive
advantages of individual countries. One can expect the shifting of foreign
affiliates from stand-alone, domestic-market orientations toward regionally
integrated production systems.
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In summary, if one raises the underlying question of the workshop concerning FDI,
namely, whether FDI based within and outside the EU will be complements or
substitutes, the answer is self-evident: whether the CEECs are members of the EU or
not, non-EU originating FDI will never be more than a complement to FDI originating
from the EU.
Discussion of Previous Paper
It was suggested that the contrasting experiences of Spain, Portugal, and Ireland on the
one hand, and Greece on the other show that EU membership is far from sufficient to
attract additional FDI. One may even assume that domestic policy is more important in
this respect than EU membership, a sensible lesson for the candidate countries.
However, if the domestic policy regime is adequate, membership will certainly give a
push to FDI.
The question was raised as to the extent to which the accession negotiations will affect
future FDI. In his answer, the presenter emphasized that since the FDI phenomenon is
rather recent, and the integration process is in flux, it is very difficult to attribute the
growth of FDI to individual factors. The announcement of the internal market in 1985
led companies to anticipate the change, and the major increase in FDI happened two
years before the start of the internal market. The Europe Agreements did not provide a
major kick to FDI and neither will be the start of the negotiations. Only when accession
is approaching with certainty will investors respond to it. In fact, the accession
negotiations themselves will not be decisive; what is important is whether or not the
legal system has adjusted to that of the EU, whatever the latter’s imperfections. If there
is substance behind the formal changes, it would provide an impetus to FDI.
Portugal has been in NATO since the 1950s. In fact, for Spain and Portugal, what
happened in the course of the transition from dictatorship to democracy was more
important than NATO membership.
4.2 Past Experience and Expectations on EU Enlargement from
Viewpoint of Japanese Investors19
The following is based partly on the experience of Nomura, a Japanese bank with a
large presence in Central and Eastern Europe that provides intermediation for portfolio
investors.
Japanese FDI has only a short history. In 1951-95, Japan spent almost $550 billion on
FDI around the world, 80 percent of this in the last 20 years. Thus, Japanese business is
a newcomer in this field. Of the total, about 44 percent was invested in North America,
12 percent in Central and South America, and only 20 percent in Europe. While this
share has oscillated from year to year, the average has remained at about 20 percent.
In the second half of the 1980s, Europe became an investment target for Japanese
companies, mainly because of the EU’s expansion and the increasing importance of its
internal market. After this boom in Japanese investment in the region, Japanese FDI
flowed back to Asia, and as a consequence, Europe’s share is currently stagnating. With
this in mind, it is easy to understand why Japanese investment has been so low in
Central and Eastern Europe: investment in all of Europe has been very negligible.
                                                
19
 This section summarizes the presentation of Tsuneo Morita.
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Nevertheless, the share of Hungary in Japanese FDI has reached 0.1 percent of the
worldwide total. For the other CEECs data on this order of magnitude cannot yet be
found. Within Japan’s European investment, Hungary’s share reached 0.36 percent in
1993, which is remarkable since it is higher than the shares of Austria, Portugal, Greece,
and Sweden. In fact, Hungarians should not complain about the weak interest of
Japanese investors.
Japanese investment strategy in Europe focuses first of all on location. As mentioned by
the previous speaker, the U.K. has been the major springboard for the Japanese
investors to the EU market. As a result, the U.K. has consistently received about 40
percent of Japanese investment in Europe.
The main reasons for the U.K.’s prominence are as follows:
1. the government of the U.K., especially under Mrs. Thatcher, has strongly
supported Japanese investment. In addition, investors have encountered no
prejudice against existing FDI in the U.K.;
2. Japanese companies have not faced strong domestic competition on the U.K.
market, but rather found local enterprises to be complementary. This has led to a
friendly coexistence between Japanese and British business;
3. The U.K.’s domestic market is rather large and has easy access to other EU
markets;
4. Japanese businessmen have found a similar “island” mentality in Britain to their
own. When we move to an unknown place, similarity in thinking and mentality
is important; and
5. Although the Japanese are not skillful with foreign languages, the English
language is the most familiar for them.
In the second half of 1980s, there was a big expansion in Japanese investment in
Europe; at the time, Japan chose the Netherlands as its next springboard to the region.
Currently, the Netherlands receives 22 percent of Japanese investment in Europe. Since
this process began only in 1987, there was a very fast buildup of investment there over
ten years.
It is not easy to find the clear reason for the choice of the Netherlands in the 1980s.
Nevertheless, in the Netherlands, Japanese business has received strong government
support, and has not sensed any prejudice against it. Access to a good seaport was also
essential for shipping the necessary material and equipment from Japan. Relatively good
infrastructure and access to European markets were further explanatory factors, but
there must be other, unknown factors that explain the choice of the Netherlands by
Japanese businesses.
Japan is currently looking for its next springboard – that is, its next production and
business base – on the eastern side of Europe. Many companies are still considering
which countries are the most suitable in that regard. The process will accelerate as EU
membership becomes a reality for the CEECs. Within the next five years, some big
move will certainly be taken by the Japanese side.
In the summer of 1997, the Nomura Research Institute conducted a survey on the
expectations of Japanese companies about the Eastern European region. The survey
covered 1,249 listed companies, mostly Nomura clients. The number of respondents
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was 310. The sectoral composition of the respondents was dominated by vehicle and
automobile companies (22 percent of the respondents) and electronics (16 percent). The
size structure was dominated by companies with 1,000-5,000 employees (41 percent),
which is considered medium-sized in Japanese terminology.
More than half of the companies surveyed already had a presence in Europe, with most
of them concentrating on the U.K., Germany, and France. They are most active in such
sectors such as vehicle and automobile production, electronics, and financial services.
Medium-sized companies play a key role in European investments, carrying out 51
percent of these investments. Among the enterprises’ main functions, sales promotion is
dominant, followed by manufacturing, and then information distribution and processing.
As for ownership, there is a preference for full Japanese ownership: 71 percent of the
joint ventures in Europe in the sample were fully Japanese owned.
What is the main factor behind the location decisions that these companies have made
within Europe? The leader among the explanatory factors is market size (42 percent),
followed by political stability (12 percent) and an established capital market (9 percent).
Among investors’ major sources of concern, the leader is fear of unstable exchange
rates.
The survey also included questions on companies’ presence in and attitudes toward
CEECs. It turns out that, while only one company out of ten was already operating in
the region, most of them had already had business experience there. As for their major
target country, the largest numbers named Poland (25 percent), the Czech Republic (23
percent), and Hungary (21 percent). As for the major functions of the existing joint
ventures in the region, the companies named sales promotion (49 percent),
manufacturing (26 percent), and sales service (15 percent).
Among the problems in the region feared by the companies, they named volatile
exchange rates (33 percent) as most important. The sectoral distribution of the planned
investments reflected the dominance of vehicle and automobile production (31 percent),
followed by electronics (24 percent) and machinery (17 percent). The most popular
countries of the region for the potential investors were Poland (33 percent), Hungary (26
percent), and the Czech Republic (18 percent). The investors plan to expand their
operation mostly in manufacturing (50 percent), sales expansion (36 percent), and sales
service (5 percent).
In answer to the question as to why their companies had not invested so far in the
region, the most frequent answers given were insufficient market size (30 percent),
inadequate geographical position (16 percent), and political volatility (13 percent).
Poland may be the next platform for Japanese companies, although there are images of
the CEE nations among Japanese businessmen which seem to contradict this
expectation. Especially among financial institutions, and to a lesser extent among
production companies, Polish workers and business are considered a bit undisciplined
and untrustworthy. Unpaid debts inherited from the communist era may have helped to
create this image.
Czech employees are considered clever and hard working in the manner of Germans,
but a bit stoic and inflexible. Slovakia has not got a concrete image, but a recent
analysis showed that there is excessive political interference in business. As for
Hungarians, the Japanese always say that they are somewhat rough, but that they are
hospitable and flexible. The Japanese see in them a certain similarity to themselves.
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This may be a partial explanation for why most Japanese investment in the region has
gone to Hungary.
Discussion of Previous Paper
Some workshop participants, citing the existing pattern of Japanese FDI, expressed
skepticism concerning CEECs’ chances for attracting such investment. Japan has
always looked to the more advanced regions in Europe (e.g., the U.K. and the
Netherlands) and not to such peripheral countries as Spain, Portugal, or Ireland. In his
answer, the presenter emphasized that the geographical position of investment sites is
very important for Japanese investors. Since each CEEC, other than Poland is very
small, Japanese companies will use them only as export bases, showing little interest in
their domestic markets. It may be that in the future Japanese companies will invest in
Poland plus one additional country in the region.
For Japanese investors, geographical distance to the future investment target country is
a major factor because, due to the scarcity of information, it is more difficult to assess
the opportunities in a more distant country from Japan. It is also harder to withdraw
investments from more distant lands in case of trouble. This is why, for instance,
German companies' presence in Asia is low. The major difference between portfolio
investment and FDI is that the former depends on opportunities and risks, while FDI
relies on the presence of markets.
A question was raised on Japanese plans with respect to such small countries as Latvia
and the other Baltic states. In reply, the presenter argued that if a market is small, the
next criterion for investors is ease of access to major neighboring markets. If such
markets are insufficiently mature, there is no hope for a small country to receive
Japanese FDI. In Toyota’s recent selection of a European site for producing compacts
cars, the company eventually decided that Central and Eastern Europe as a region was
not sufficiently mature for the investment. Toyota may choose a site in this region in the
next stage of its expansion.
4.3 Integrated European Capital Market and Impact of Euro:
Portuguese Experience with Capital Flows After Accession20
Capital flows are traditionally divided into FDI and portfolio investment, with FDI
further broken down into that going into manufacturing, tourism, and banking and
financial services, and portfolio investment into that flowing into bonds and equities.
There is also short-term foreign investment of a speculative nature. However, these
distinctions have increasingly become blurred. With the modernization of the financial
system, FDI into banking and financial services is difficult to separate from portfolio
investment.
It remains important to focus on FDI in manufacturing, because it plays an important
role in changing comparative advantage and raising productivity. However, FDI in
Portugal is not just in manufacturing, but increasingly in tourism and banking and
financial services. This is related to the EMU and Portugal’s opportunity to participate
in it from its inception.
                                                
20 This section summarizes the presentation on the impact of EU accession on the Portuguese economy of
Nuno Cassola.
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An important issue for countries acceding to the EU is real convergence, which
necessitates structural change. The convergence process is equilibrium-revealing and
results in a gradual upward movement of the price level. This movement is easy to
confuse with a loss of international competitiveness and an unsustainable movement in
relative prices. However, in Portugal, where a real appreciation of the equilibrium
exchange rate has been necessary for nominal adjustment, there is a link between real
convergence and nominal adjustment.
Nominal adjustment means fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria, which for Portugal
entails a reduction in inflation, convergence of nominal bond yields to their reference
values, a stable nominal exchange rate, and a sharp fiscal adjustment. Modernization of
the financial system is helpful by fostering fiscal adjustment, privatization, nominal
adjustment, and changes in monetary policy. When there is nominal adjustment and
structural change, monetary policy must change as well.
Portugal has been a member of EFTA since 1959, signed a trade treaty with the EU (at
the time, the European Economic Community) in 1972, and acceded to the EU in 1986.
The last of these actions has had the biggest impact on Portuguese financial inflows and
outflows.
Portugal has mainly been a recipient of FDI, with outflows amounting to only about 20
percent of inflows. Flows have been volatile, but have stabilized since accession. In
1995 and 1996, there was a remarkable change, as Portugal became a net foreign direct
investor, rather than a net recipient. The story for portfolio flows is similar, as most of
the action on this front has taken place since accession, in particular after 1992. In
January 1993, Portugal fully liberalized its capital account, and the bulk of portfolio
flows have occurred since then.
We can clearly see the effects of the political crisis of 1975 and 1976 in a decline in FDI
relative to GDP. With democratic normalization – that is, the election of a new
government, approval of an IMF adjustment program, and the commitment of the
president to join the EEC (in 1977) – FDI picked up relative to GDP.
Why has Portugal been so attractive to foreign investors? Relatively low costs have
given the country considerable growth potential, and that has been the main factor
behind the surge in capital inflows.
In the 1960s, the main trading partners were the U.S., Portugal’s African colonies, and
the U.K. In 1980, Portugal’s main trading partners were the U.K. and Germany, both
quite distant from the country; Portugal was blocked off from the European market by
Spain. At that time, there were only narrow, winding roads from Portugal to the French
border. Most trade went by sea, making Portugal something of an island economy.
In 1980, Spain accounted for only 3.6 percent of Portuguese exports, 5.5 percent of its
imports, and 1 percent of total FDI inflows, while West Germany was responsible for
11.7 percent of exports, 13.5 percent of imports, and 9.8 percent of FDI. There is a
historical reason for the importance of economic relations with the U.K.: the two
countries have been allies since the 12th century, the oldest alliance in Europe. In 1980,
14.8 percent of exports went to the U.K., 8.6 percent of imports came from there, and
that country accounted for 14 percent of FDI. After their independence in the mid-
1970s, the former African colonies vanished as trading partners, as those countries were
ravaged by civil wars; trade with them is now slowly recovering. The importance of
economic relations with the U.S. has been declining.
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By 1996, the picture had totally changed. Spain is now Portugal’s main trading partner,
accounting for 14 percent of exports, 22 percent of imports, and 87 percent of net FDI.
This represents regional integration, as Portugal is now part of a larger Iberian economic
space. The U.K. was responsible for 10.8 percent of exports, 6.7 percent of imports, and
30 percent of FDI. France accounted for 14 percent of exports and 11 percent of
imports. Germany was responsible for 21 percent of exports, 11 percent of imports, and
-12 percent of FDI (i.e., it is disinvesting).
Infrastructure investment in Portugal and Spain have changed dramatically the costs of
transport for these countries to the heart of Europe. EU funds have been used to build
roads, railways, and communications.
Looking at the current account of the balance of payments, we see that there has been a
structural trade deficit, as Portugal has been importing machinery that it does not
produce. Investment opportunities in the country exceed its savings capacity, so we see
a typical case of intertemporal smoothing of consumption and investment. In the past,
the trade deficit was financed by private transfers from Portuguese resident abroad,
services (mainly tourism), and a small amount of public transfers; the result was a
reasonably balanced current account. More recently, EU funds have grown in
importance, now amounting to 5 percent of GDP.
Since capital inflows have generally overwhelmed the current account deficit, the
authorities have been posed with a tremendous structural adjustment problem arising
from large-scale liquidity creation. Their goal has been to have macroeconomic
stability, meaning a stable exchange rate and low inflation.
FDI plays a major role in changing a country’s comparative advantages, especially
when it affects the cost of transport. Portugal has had comparative advantages in labor-
intensive industries, such as clothing, footwear, and textiles; scale-intensive industries,
such as pottery, china, and paper products; and resource-intensive industries, such as
wood and paper products. But this situation is changing rapidly. The new directions of
the economy involve scale-intensive industries, such as transport equipment, chemicals,
and rubber products; differentiated goods, such as industrial machinery (for wood- and
metalworking), nonferrous metals, and leather.
The share of Portuguese exports accounted for by clothing and footwear is falling and
that of machinery and transport equipment is rising. FDI has been especially important
in the automotive sector. First, there was investment in this sector by Renault, followed
more recently by an investment by Volkswagen and Ford to produce a car for the
European market. Studies show that FDI was instrumental in raising productivity in
sectors receiving such investment. That investment created some positive externalities,
as Portuguese firms in sectors where FDI was dominant had to adapt to raise their own
productivity.
Since 1990, FDI has been falling in Portugal (and to a lesser extent in Spain), while it
has been rising in CEECs. Germany, especially, has shifted its investment toward the
Central and East European region.
Portugal suffered from an adjustment problem when it entered the EEC: it had 10
percent inflation, well above Spain’s and Germany’s. Moreover, before accession,
Portugal’s financial system was characterized by nationalized banks – which were
sheltered from foreign competition – and a poorly developed capital market (see
Table 5). After accession, the country liberalized and deregulated its financial system,
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and privatized these banks, and the capital market revived. These changes in turn forced
revisions in monetary and exchange rate policy. The authorities abandoned the use of
direct methods of monetary control, such as credit ceilings, administratively fixed
interest rates, and capital controls. They currently employ indirect, market-based
methods.
Exchange rate policy was also changed: a passive crawling peg that simply offset
previous inflation vis-à-vis Portugal’s main trading partners was eliminated. During
1990-92, Portugal employed a “shadowing” exchange rate mechanism (similar to that
used by the U.K. at the time), and in April 1992 it joined the Exchange Rate
Mechanism.
Table 5:  Economic Policy in Portugal Before and After EU Accession
Before Accession to the
European Union
After Accession to the
European Union
Monetary
Policy
Direct methods of monetary control:
•  credit ceilings;
•  administratively fixed interest rates;
•  capital controls on external
    transactions.
Indirect methods of monetary control
(1991):
•  market based mechanisms;
•  intervention interest rates;
•  elimination of capital controls
    on external transactions.
Exchange
Rate
Policy
 “crawling peg” regime:
pre-announced monthly depreciation
rate of the escudo vis-à-vis a basket
of
13 currencies;
•  designed to offset the Portuguese
    inflation differential vis-à-vis its
    major trading partners;
•  discrete devaluation.
 “crawling peg” regime (1986-90):
•  reduction of the escudo’s monthly
    depreciation rate.
Limited float (1990-92):
a composite index of leading ERM
currencies was adopted as a
reference medium-term objective;
ERM membership since April 1992.
Financial
System
•  Financial institutions sheltered from
    foreign competition;
•  nationalized banking system;
•  poorly developed capital market.
•  Liberalization and deregulation in
    the context of the Single Market;
•  privatization of nationalized
    banks;
•  revival of the capital market.
Fiscal
Policy
Large fiscal imbalances due to:
•  vigorous expenditure growth only
    partially offset by rising revenues;
•  inefficient tax system.
Overall reform of public finances:
•  adoption of medium term
    programs of fiscal
    consolidation based on
    expenditure restraint;
•  tax system reform (direct and
    indirect taxation);
•  privatization.
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The costs of Portugal’s efforts to converge to the Maastricht criteria have been
moderate. GDP growth has been above the average of the EU-15, except during 1993
and 1994. Despite some increases in the unemployment rate, it remains substantially
below the average for those countries. The difference between Portuguese and German
bond yields has declined since January 1996 and is now only 20 basis points, roughly
equal to the remaining sovereign risk.
Discussion of Previous Paper
The discussion following the presentation emphasized how encouraging the Portuguese
experience was for acceding transition countries and the importance of investment in
transport infrastructure for changing Portugal’s comparative advantages and trade
patterns. Another point that arose was that before making the adjustments toward
meeting the Maastricht criteria, capital flowed in because the authorities ran a tight
monetary policy to curb inflation and kept the exchange rate stable, so there was little
risk in investing in Portugal. After adjustment, interest rates fell and it became less
profitable to speculate. Sterilization was used to mop up excess liquidity, as central
bank paper was sold to private banks; that paper could be used as collateral in repo
transactions. The authorities also used reserve requirements, liberalized capital
outflows, and used some of the inflows to retire public debt and pay off inherited
foreign debt.
Portugal has now become a net exporter of capital, as firms realize the need to establish
networks to benefit from the single market. The government has encouraged this
process by offering incentives to invest abroad. Portuguese firms are also investing now
in Brazil and Morocco.
5.  Technological Cooperation: EU Programs Limited to
Europe or Broader Schemes? Opening Up of EUREKA to
Globalization and to Requests of European Industry21
This discussion focuses on three topics: what EUREKA is; how it developed from a
West European organization into a European one; and how it is facing and preparing
itself for globalization.
EUREKA is a child of the Cold War, a try to position Europe between the U.S. and
Japan in the technological field. Its founding in 1985 was an answer to the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, popularly known as “Star Wars”). French President
François Mitterand held that Europe should not participate in SDI, but should foster
cooperation within Europe in developing and promoting civilian technology.
EUREKA was created as a network for European cooperation, not affiliated with the
European Commission (EC), because the French, Germans, and many others thought
that the EC was excessively bureaucratic, large, and rigid. EUREKA’s most important
characteristics are that it is not an organization, but a network; that it provides a
framework for cooperation between research and industry; and that it is an instrument
for exploiting R&D results and innovation. The objective in creating EUREKA was to
                                                
21 This section summarizes the presentation on the EUREKA program and its relations with Central and
Eastern Europe of Benno Schmidt-Küntzel.
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increase European competitiveness vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan – the main competitors
at the time – and to promote cooperation in the field of high technology. In practice, the
key aspect of EUREKA’s activities is fostering innovation within Europe.
Although EUREKA is not part of the EC system, the EC is one of EUREKA’s 26
members. In principle, the EC concentrates on pre-competitive, top-down, less applied
research requiring large central funding, with the results becoming the property of the
EC and the partners cooperating on the project. EUREKA concentrates on market-
oriented, bottom-up research, requiring less funding (which comes from individual
nations), with the results becoming the property of the partners alone.
That EUREKA’s approach is bottom-up means that it has no clear program and no
priorities; it issues no calls for proposals, but waits for its clients to take the initiative.
Those clients are research institutes (including universities) and industrial corporations,
who may come up with a proposal at any time, on any subject, using any technology, as
long as it is innovative and such that international cooperation would be more efficient
than national cooperation.
EUREKA receives no European funding, but only decentralized, national, and relatively
small funding. If, for example, a Hungarian participant wants to cooperate in a Eureka
project, he must seek funds from the Hungarian State Committee for Science and
Technology. This fact scares away many firms. However, according to a Danish study,
while many partners came to EUREKA largely to obtain funding, at the end of their
projects they realized that the framework that it provided for cooperation and the
EUREKA quality label were more important than that funding.
Total investment sponsored by Eureka is 16-17 billion ecu, compared to 13 billion ecu
in the EC’s European Framework Program (EFP). But these figures are not comparable.
EFP funding is for 4-5 years, which is the lifetime of the program, and includes only
public money. EUREKA funding is for 10-11 years and comes from both the private
and public sectors.
The participants in EUREKA projects come 70 percent from industry (60 percent of
those from small and medium-sized enterprises) and 30 percent from research institutes
and universities. But the situation is the opposite in CEECs, where academic institutions
make the most proposals. While in the whole of EUREKA 29 percent of all
participating organizations are from industry, from CEECs the percentage is only 14;
but while 15 percent of all participants are research institutes and 12 percent are
universities, for CEECs the percentages are 34.5 percent and 15.5 percent, respectively.
The difference between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe in this regard
partly results from the fact that research institutes in the latter are being downsized,
privatized, and forced to earn their own money. At the same time, industry in CEECs is
struggling for day-to-day survival and less interested in long-term cooperation and
innovation. This will change in the future.
Out of a total of 668 projects, Germany (with 219), France (203), the Netherlands (163),
and the U.K. (149) are the largest players in EUREKA. However, the picture is
somewhat different with respect to the amounts of money invested. The countries that
really take the initiative in projects include such smaller ones as Austria and
Switzerland.
Although EUREKA does not emphasize particular technological sectors, for statistical
purposes it compiles a sectoral breakdown by numbers of projects. The environment is
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the subject with the largest number thereof (with 138), followed by biotechnology
(127), information (119), robotics (96), materials (76), and transportation (47). In terms
of funding, information is by the largest sector.
EUREKA has by now outgrown the EU. The process of expanding beyond the EU
began in 1992, when Hungary joined, followed by Russia in 1993, Slovenia in 1994, the
Czech Republic and Poland in 1995, and Romania in 1997. The EC has been a rather
unimportant member, although EUREKA believes that there are certain large projects
for European industry that require cooperation between it and the EC.
In addition to membership, EUREKA has established a network of national information
points (NIP) in post-communist countries which coordinate and promote cooperation
within the EUREKA network; the countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, with the Baltic states being the most active. There are
a few countries with which there has been no involvement, including Belarus, Moldova,
and Yugoslavia. Croatia has just stated that it wants to open a EUREKA office, with a
visit expected by that country’s deputy minister of science and technology.
Under the British chair, a group of high representatives of European industry
recommended in the 1996 Davignon Report that, rather than exhibiting a “Fortress
Europe” mentality, that industry should go global, seeking partners on a global scale,
and that EUREKA should follow this initiative. Such globalization has now been
integrated into EUREKA’s medium-term plan (covering 1996-2000), although it has
developed no clear policy yet in this direction.
Concretely, there is a special agreement with Israel, some partnership and brokerage
events with the U.S., and under the Portuguese chairmanship there were partnership and
brokerage events with Macao. China seems very interested in opening a EUREKA
office, but distance from Europe and a lack of resources are problems. At the moment,
only 26 of 668 projects involve countries that are not members of EUREKA.
In summary, EUREKA fits well with national policies on innovation and cooperation
between research establishments and industry. It is a flexible instrument, but it is
underperforming, in that its service to its members could be must better, especially as
regards integration with CEECs. EUREKA provides a protective environment for
cooperation according to free market rules; it ensures that a university or small
enterprise is not exploited by big industry.
Discussion of Previous Paper
In the discussion, it was emphasized that relations between the EC and EUREKA have
been distant, the EC viewing it as underfunded, and excessively flexible and
decentralized. The two organizations have cultures and rules that are too different from
each other to cooperate well. There are some strategic projects for the survival of
European industry where the two bodies could collaborate, the EC on basic research and
EUREKA on work closer to the market, but it appears that the EC is not interested in
this.
A number of concrete projects involving participants from CEECs were listed. These
include plastic springs for cars, trucks, and buses (U.K., Czech Republic, Lithuania);
tiny electrical engines with permanent magnets (Czech Republic); and a project to
recommend solutions to the problems of Silesian coal and steel regions (Austria,
Poland, Czech Republic).
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It was also noted that there are no statistics allowing one to determine the efficiency of
projects involving CEECs relative to other projects. Generally, West European countries
have taken the lead, but this is changing. Finally, it was observed that while EUREKA’s
activities must be in the interest of its European clients, if those clients want to find
technology or other forms of cooperation outside of Europe, that is no problem for
EUREKA.
6.  Agriculture
6.1 Opportunities and Challenges of EU Accession: Perspective
of Polish Farming Sector22
Poland continues to have a substantial agricultural sector, accounting for 25 percent of
the labor force and 6 percent of GDP. Some EU member states, such as Greece, have a
similar share of the labor force in agriculture, but twice the share of that sector in GDP,
demonstrating the low level of productivity in Polish agriculture.
This situation results from the fragmented nature of farms, with a farm of three hectares
often divided into 20-30 pieces of land in different locations. There is also excessive
labor remaining in agriculture, with huge hidden unemployment (in rural areas, 50
percent of people under 30 years of age are jobless), insufficient work for all people
living on farms, and low incomes which have declined relative to those in other sectors.
The agricultural population’s educational level is low on average. Almost half of the
farm population receives its income mainly from retirement pensions or work outside
the farm. Very few farms are specialized, with most farms having a mixed production
structure.
Some 75 percent of farmers do not see any prospects for their farms in the future. Many
farmers say that their situations were better in the old days, which is surprising, since
agriculture was the only sector where private property was maintained and market
economy kept alive. It is difficult for small farmers to learn and adapt to the
requirements of the capitalist economy. They expected more state intervention on the
market, state control of prices, and guaranteed profitability and markets. The farming
population has little knowledge of the impact of EU accession on its situation.
The interests of Poland and the EU with respect to Polish accession are not identical; the
EU may obtain different benefits and bear different costs from Poland. The EU will
decide the conditions governing Poland’s joining the club and Poland must accept those
rules. If the gap between the EU’s choices and Poland’s preferences is too big, there
could be a problem with the passage of the national referendum on the accession treaty.
Poland’s officials are told that in joining the EU it must accept the Acquis
Communautaire, but Poland asks whether there is but one acquis or different ones for
different countries. Especially in agriculture, there is reason to believe that there will be
one acquis for current member states and another one for candidate members. One gets
this impression especially from Agenda 2000, which says that applicant countries will
not have access to compensatory payments because they will not face price declines.
                                                
22 This section summarizes the presentation of the paper “Implications for Polish EU Accession for the
)DUP6HFWRU3ROLVK3HUVSHFWLYH´E\:áDG\VáDZ3LVNRU]
45
The current acquis was adapted to the needs of the current members, which are
generally better off than Poland (which has one-third of the EU average GDP per capita)
and have much smaller agricultural sectors. Poland has the potential to be a net
agricultural exporter, even if at present it is a net importer of such products. Policies
suitable for agricultural importers in the 1950s and 1960s may not be appropriate for
actual or potential exporters such as Poland.
In the European Commission’s Opinion and proposal for Accession Partnership, one
requirement placed on Poland was to work out on short notice a coherent, well-defined
strategy for rural development. But the EU itself does not yet have such a strategy; it
has neither presented any good proposals nor had any good experience in this
connection.
Understandably and legitimately, Poland expects that accession will help it increase
agricultural support and protection. Economists criticize this sort of assistance as
unsound and there is reasons to agree with the critics of the EU’s Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). But in a country such as Poland, with its huge agricultural sector, such
support has considerable political significance. Transfers would make it easier to
convince the rural population that accession is beneficial.
With the publication of Agenda 2000, it is now clear that the “transfer window” will be
closed to Poland. As compensation, Poland is offered access to the Regional and Rural
Development Funds, but there are strings attached to the availability of such funds.
First, those funds may not exceed 4 percent of GDP. The Agricultural Policy Analysis
Unit (APAU), under the PHARE program have calculated that if compensatory
payments were applied under the same conditions as to current member states, they
would exceed that level. Second, the funds are subject to co-funding requirements.
Poland holds that the treatment of the application of compensation payments in Agenda
2000 is logically inconsistent with the concept and spirit of the single European market.
How can such a market exist when some farmers are paid compensation payments and
others are not? Payments are compensation for the removal of the previous level of
support, but the problem is that farmers in candidate countries were never fortunate
enough to receive that support.
Two years ago, the APAU conducted a series of analyses using assumptions tailored to
meet the conditions prevailing in 1991-93, in an attempt to determine the impact of EU
accession on the Polish farming sector. It repeated this analysis two years later using
assumptions for 1994-96. In the meantime, the farm-gate price gap between Poland and
the EU had narrowed. In the earlier analysis, it was incorrectly assumed that that price
gap would narrow only if Poland acceded to the EU. But it is now clear that such a price
realignment will occur regardless of whether Poland accedes. One reason for the
declining price gap is the real appreciation of the Polish currency. A second is the
increasing protection of agricultural products in Polish trade.
Accordingly, accession to the EU should not result in a significant increase in the
production of major agricultural products nor a major increase in prices. The cost to the
EU budget of extending CAP measures would be about 4.3 billion ecu, a figure that
would be reduced by 70-80 percent if compensatory payments are not provided to
Poland.
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6.2 Is CEFTA a Substitute for or a Supplement to EU Accession?
Case of Agricultural Trade23
This paper examines whether CEFTA will be a substitute for or a supplement to EU
accession in the field of agriculture.
CEFTA was signed in December 1992 among the three Visegrád countries at the time.
The main motivation was to prevent a further contraction of foreign trade among those
countries and to promote an increase in mutual trade, on the basis of certain
complementarities in their economic structures and the similarity of their levels of
economic development. As a consequence of these countries’ signing association
agreements with the EU, some trade diversion had occurred and their mutual trade had
contracted. The most important aspect of CEFTA is the liberalization of foreign trade,
first and foremost by reducing and eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers, especially
on industrial goods.
After five years, some 90 percent of industrial goods are traded freely and all such
goods are covered by concessions. About 80 percent of agricultural products traded
within CEFTA are covered by some kind of concession. As a result of this
liberalization, the share of CEFTA countries in each other’s trade has increased, albeit
from a low base; it does not yet exceed 10 percent and has not reached pre-transition
levels (see Table 6).
There will be some expansion of within-CEFTA agricultural trade because of further
trade liberalization, because of the establishment (in 1997) of the pan-European
cumulation zone, and because of the enlargement of CEFTA by the addition of
Slovenia, Romania, and in the future Bulgaria.
CEFTA’s agricultural provisions are quite complex. At present, agricultural products
are classified into three groups. The first, the “duty-free list,” contains goods on which
tariffs are eliminated. The second group lists products with CEFTA-wide, unified tariff
rates which are below the rates implied by most-favored-nation status, although certain
quantitative restrictions remain. The third contains products for which bilateral
concessions were given.
There is a consensus that future agricultural trade liberalization within CEFTA would be
desirable. But most CEFTA members have moved in the opposite direction, examples
being the Czech and Slovak import deposits and certain recent Polish moves against
Hungarian meat shipments.
There have been some achievements in agricultural trade as a result of the formation of
CEFTA. For Hungary, CEFTA is growing in importance as an agricultural market, with
12.9 percent of its agricultural exports now going in that direction (compared to an EU
share of 44 percent), versus 4-5 percent in the past (see Table 7). Hungary is a net
agricultural exporter with respect to both CEFTA and the EU. Hungarian export growth
to CEFTA has been so rapid because it has followed an export-oriented agricultural
development strategy, with its main interest in this regard being to find reliable and
expanding markets for its agricultural products. It also wants to regain traditional
markets in CEECs.
                                                
23
 This section summarizes the presentation of the paper “Agricultural Trade within CEFTA: A Substitute
or Supplement to EU Accession?” by Judit Kiss.
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Table 6:  Share of CEFTA-Countriesa in Individual CEFTA Countries’ Exports
and Imports (%)
Czech Republicb Slovakiac Hungary Poland Slovenia
    Ex     Im   Ex   Im   Ex  Im  Ex  Im   Ex  Im
1993     5.8
 (27.3)
    4.3
 (21.8)
   8.1
(50.5)
   3.6
(39.5)
  6.7  5.7  5.9  4.1   4.2  5.1
1994     7.8
 (24.2)
    4.4
 (18.6)
   9.0
(46.4)
   4.5
(34.1)
  7.0  6.7  6.1  4.6   4.4  6.1
1995     7.3
 (21.2)
    4.1
 (15.9)
 10.1
(45.3)
   5.5
(33.2)
  7.9  7.0  7.1  6.0   4.9  6.7
1996     8.3
 (22.6)
    4.5
 (14.1)
 10.4
(41.4)
   5.0
(29.5)
  8.8  7.7  6.1  5.8   5.5  6.5
aCzech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
bData in brackets include the country’s exports to Slovakia.
cData in brackets include the country’s exports to the Czech Republic.
Source: Based on data in Sándor Richter, “European Integration: The CEFTA and Europe
Agreements,” Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, 1997.
Note: Ex: Exports; Im: Imports.
Another important factor is the activity of foreign capital and foreign direct investment.
Most multinational corporations active on the Hungarian market have concentrated on
that market, but since it is limited, they want to expand beyond Hungary’s borders.
They are trying to expand their exports to neighboring markets, including those of the
CEFTA countries, and are thus interested in further agricultural trade liberalization
within CEFTA. A further aspect of the situation is the export of Hungarian capital to
CEFTA countries, which has also played a role in the expansion of the country’s
agricultural exports to these countries; subcontracting has occurred in the food industry,
which is trade creating. Hungary’s agricultural imports from the region are very limited.
In conclusion, it can be said that at the beginning of the 1990s there was a need to
revitalize economic cooperation within CEFTA and that CEFTA has turned out to be a
vital organization. But it is only a supplement to EU accession, not a substitute for it.
Still, it could play an important role in promoting accession of its members to the EU,
largely through coordination of accession strategies. At present, CEFTA countries are
competing, rather than cooperating in those strategies; they are competing for EU
markets, for each other’s markets, for other eastern markets, to attract foreign capital,
and for EU accession.
Such competitive attitudes may decrease the countries’ bargaining strengths; what is
needed is coordination of strategies on such issues as migration, accession, and
agriculture. In the last of these areas, harmonization is required on such issues as
compensation payments, production controls, quotas, transition periods, and accession
to the agricultural funds.
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Table 7:  The Share of CEFTA in Hungarian and Polish Agricultural Trade (%)
                     Hungary                       Poland
      Exports       Imports       Exports       Imports
        1991            4.9           4.7           1.5           5.5
        1992            7.2           4.0           1.0           5.4
        1993            8.4           4.7           2.8           3.5
        1994            9.3           4.1           2.4           3.6
        1995          10.6           3.7           2.8           7.9
        1996          12.9           3.4           n.a.           n.a.
Source: For Hungary, János Kartali, “A CEFTA országok és Magyarország agrár-
külkereskedelme,” Agrárgazdasági Kutató és Informatikai Intézet, Budapest, 1996; and own
calculations. For Poland, calculations were made by Balázs Szilágyi on the basis of Polish
national statistics.
Discussion of Previous Two Papers
The discussion began with an expression of surprise that the presenters were so
uncritical of the CAP, which can be described as a disaster, that is contrary to
everything that EU member countries and CEECs have been told about the market, the
private sector, and the role of government. The main instrument of the CAP is price
supports, which have raised EU prices to two to three times world levels, leading to
overproduction, which in turn has led to subsidized exports to the world market (further
reducing world prices and hurting Third World producers). Higher product prices also
raise land prices, which results in more intensive farming and enhanced environmental
degradation.
If the CAP is implemented unchanged in CEECs, there will be enormous costs to those
countries’ citizens, who are poorer than those in the EU. It was argued that acceding
countries should not take the existence of an unchanged CAP as given, but should push
for reforming it. Further discussion of this emphasized that CEECs did not believe that
they were in strong enough bargaining positions to argue against the CAP, that they do
not know in what direction it will be reformed before they accede, and that the CAP’s
failings were common knowledge in these countries.
In the discussion, it was noted that it is too soon to tell what the effects of the
categorization of agricultural exports within CEFTA into three groups had done to trade
in them, since that scheme has only come into existence at the end of 1996. In Hungary,
exports are divided approximately evenly into the three categories. It was also noted that
with both CEFTA agricultural trade liberalization and the EU association agreements,
foreign trade measures are less important than whether countries are in a position to
make use of the concessions offered them.
In the case of CEFTA, another important factor is FDI, with 67 percent of the assets in
the Hungarian food industry in the hands of foreign investors, which means that such
investors are in powerful decision-making positions. Certain CEFTA countries,
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especially as their domestic economic situations have deteriorated, have taken measures
that counterbalance the liberalizing effects of trade policy moves.
Other points made in the discussion included the following: that the most important
pressure for CAP reform will not come from the acceding countries, but from the next
round of World Trade Organization negotiations, U.S. pressure on the EU, and the fact
that latest U.S. farm bill provides for expansion of production and exports; that the
uncertainties over future EU agricultural policy complicate policy-making in that sphere
in the acceding countries, especially in Poland, with its large agricultural constituency;
and that CAP reform is being forced on the EU by budget constraints, environmental
and rural development issues, and loss of world markets.
Further points included the following: that EU products seem to crowd out Hungarian
products on CEFTA markets, while Hungarian products compete with EU products on
EU markets, but those Hungarian goods are often produced by multination companies
based in the EU; that Hungarian milk quotas, while seemingly introduced to acquaint
local farmers with the EU’s quota regimes, are different from those regimes in that in
Hungary they exceed production levels.
Finally, the discussion turned to the fate of CEFTA once, as is likely, certain of its
members accede to the EU before the others. The points made included the following:
that if that happens, CEFTA will have had too short a life to have been relevant; and
that trade between current CEFTA countries that accede will increase much more after
they accede, It was noted that CEFTA differs from the European Free Trade Agreement
in that the countries remaining in the latter are wealthier than those that acceded to the
EU, while for CEFTA, it would be the other way around, so having some of its
members leave would likely destroy CEFTA.
7.  Will There be a Tripolar World? New Regionalism
and Eastern Enlargement
7.1 Trends and Future Prospects for Trade and FDI Within Europe
and Between Europe, America, and Asia24
One of the main questions at this workshop is whether Central and Eastern Europe
should consider the EU and the other major players in the world economy (i.e., America
and Asia) complements or substitutes. One sometimes has the impression that
politicians see them as substitutes. Clearly, CEECs displays a strong bias toward the
EU, especially in trade, which would be natural if regionalization were the only game in
town. But that is only part of the story: regionalization is occurring in the context of
globalization, which has important implications. More concretely, Central and Eastern
Europe may face considerable costs if it considers regionalization as an alternative to
taking part in the global division of labor.
It is indisputable that there has been an increasing division of labor on a global scale for
the last 20 to 25 years: trade has grown faster than production worldwide. Is this due to
                                                
24This section summarizes the presentation of the paper “Will There be a Tripolar World? New
Regionalism and the Eastern Enlargement” by Peter Nunnenkamp.
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regionalization or globalization? This question is of more than academic interest, since
if the international division of labor is proceeding at beyond the regional level, decision-
makers should consider all regions of the world when making their policy choices.
Moreover, if regionalization were the only thing happening, lower-income countries
such as CEECs would have no chance to catch up economically with the more advanced
nations if they were not part of a regional bloc (such as the EU in the case of CEECs).
On the other hand, if we observe both regionalization and globalization, poorer
countries may be able to catch up even without belonging to any bloc. Furthermore, if
the latter is the case, CEECs will most probably have to play two games simultaneously,
both joining the EU and becoming involved in the global division of labor.
Do the stylized facts show that we are proceeding in the direction of a tripolar world or is the
division of labor becoming closer, not only at the regional level but also between the three
regional poles? Those poles are “Europe” (the EU, EFTA, and Central and Eastern Europe),
“America” (the U.S., Canada, and Latin America), and “Asia” (Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
and developing East and South Asia).
The first stylized fact is that the share of intraregional trade in world exports increased between
1980 and 1996. That might suggest that regionalization has been dominant over globalization.
However, the share of intra-European trade in world trade has held steady at about 30 percent.
Ironically, the increasing trend in the overall share of intraregional trade is entirely due to Asia,
the only one of three poles without the institutionalized regionalism exemplified by the EU or
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The second stylized fact is that, not surprisingly, the share of intraregional trade within a
region’s total trade is highest in Europe; that share increased only marginally between 1980 and
1996. Consistent with the first stylized fact, the increase in this indicator is greatest in Asia.
The third stylized fact is that the increasing trade intensity within Europe has not come
at the expense of America or Asia (see Table 8). Trade intensity is a measure of whether
trade with a given partner is more of less significant than the economic size of that
partner would suggest. A trade intensity in excess of unity indicates a bias toward a
given partner.
The evidence shows that, not surprisingly, in both 1980 and 1996, intraregional trade
intensity was above unity. Did the increase in intra-European trade intensity come at the
expense of trade with America and Asia? The answer is negative, since trade intensity
with America remained roughly constant, while that with Asia, traditionally fairly low,
increased somewhat. The only case where increasing intraregional trade intensity
occurred simultaneously with declining trade intensity with other regions was America.
Between 1980 and 1996, trade expanded within all three regions, but European exports
to the other two regions expanded by even more. The growth in European trade with
Asia occurred from a low base, but even so, it is clear that both regionalization and
globalization are taking place.
The fourth stylized fact is that data on FDI flows reflect both regionalization and
globalization. European FDI is heavily concentrated within Europe, but European
investors have been increasing their activity in Asia, again from a low base. FDI from
Asia is heavily concentrated in America, but Asian FDI within Asia has grown rapidly.
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Table 8:  Trade Intensitya Within and Between America, Asia, and Europeb
Exports to
Exports from America Asia Europe
        1980          2.18           1.06          0.56America
        1996c          2.31           0.86          0.45
        1980          1.24           2.50          0.37Asia
        1996c          1.07           2.03          0.40
        1980          0.43           0.30          1.41Europe
        1996          0.42           0.37          1.69
aCalculated as: Iij = (Xij / Xi) : (Xwj / Xw), with: Xij = exports of region i to region j; Xi = total
exports of region i; X
wj = world exports to region j; Xw = world exports to all destinations.
bAmerica: Canada, U.S., and Latin America; Asia: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and
developing countries in “other Asia” (excluding Middle East); Europe: all European industrial
countries and Central and Eastern Europe (excluding former USSR).
cExports in 1995, instead of 1996, for Australia and New Zealand, Japan, and United States.
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
Table 9:  Trade Intensity of Central and Eastern Europea with Selected Trading Partners
Industrial
countries in
Europe
Central and
Eastern
Europea
Canada
and United
States
Latin
America
Japan DCs in
Asiab
A:  CEEC exports to selected trading partnersc
1980       0.50        6.04       0.12     0.30     0.06      0.40
1992       1.10        6.57       0.14     0.28     0.14      0.43
1996       1.53        7.19       0.15     0.23     0.07      0.22
B:  Exports of selected trading partners to CEECsd
1980       0.51        6.04       0.24     0.40     0.15      0.33
1992       1.34        6.57       0.22     0.26     0.14      0.30
1996e       1.51        7.19       0.15     0.16     0.08      0.31
aExcluding former USSR.
bExcluding Middle East.
cShare of CEECs’ exports to the particular trading partner in total exports of CEECs, relative to
the share of the trading partner’s overall imports in world trade.
dShare of the particular trading partner’s exports to CEECs in the trading partner’s total exports,
relative to the share of CEECs’ overall imports in world trade.
e1995 for exports of Japan and United States.
Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
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One implication for Central and Eastern Europe of these stylized facts is that if CEEC
decision-makers concentrate excessively on Europe, they may miss opportunities to
export to countries outside Europe and to attract FDI from there. Some facts are
reassuring: the U.S. is the second largest foreign investor in Central and Eastern Europe
and even Japan, whose total investment in the region ranks relatively low, is ahead of
such countries as the U.K. and France.
However, with respect to trade, there is a strong bias in favor of European partners.
Central and Eastern Europe’s trade intensity with the industrial countries of Europe
increased tremendously between 1980 and 1996 (see Table 9). This is to be expected on
the basis of gravity models. Nonetheless, there may be grounds for concern in the
extremely low and declining trade intensities with Asia and Latin America.
This suggests that some policy-makers in CEECs are excessively interested in
regionalization, which will hurt the region’s chances of catching up by attracting FDI.
For example, if trade with Japan continues to decline, it will reduce CEECs’
attractiveness to Japanese investors. Current thinking in economics tends to see FDI and
trade as complements rather than substitutes.
7.2 Are Trading Blocs Emerging in World Economy: Empirical
Evidence and Economic Policy Evaluation25
The question of whether three trading and (possibly) investment blocs are emerging is
important for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), because if so, CEE’s options will
differ from what they would be in a situation where this were not the case.
We can define three related concepts, the first being bloc formation, which means a
relative concentration of trade or investment among groups of countries which have
signed a formal agreement on integration. The second concept is regionalization, which
refers to the same thing as bloc formation, except that the agreement is informal. The
difference between these two notions is important, because in the case of the former,
policies play a role, while the latter may be due to spontaneous factors. The third
concept is polarization, which means that the trade of a region is totally focused on
another one, an example being African trade with Western Europe.
We can examine a “network of world trade,” which is a sort of input-output matrix
showing trade within and among eight regions of the world in 1960 and 1995 (see Table
10). The regions are Western Europe, Japan, North America, CEE, Africa, Asia
(including Australia, South Asia, East Asia other than Japan, and the Pacific islands),
Latin America, and the rest of the world (mainly the oil-exporting countries). Total
world trade over this period rose from $128 billion to $4.89 trillion. The share of
Western Europe in both exports and imports increased because of the free trade
arrangement in that region. Japan’s exports as a share of world trade rose, America’s
declined, and Africa’s collapsed, as did CEE’s.
                                                
25This section summarizes the presentation of the paper of the same name by Jacob Kol.
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Table 10:  Network of World Trade, 1960 and 1995 (percentage distribution)
Region of Destination1960
Region of
Origin WE JPN NA CEE AFR ASIA LA ROW World
Western Europe  23    •    4     2     3      3   3      2    40
Japan    •    •    1     •     •      1   •      •      3
North America    7    1    5     •     •      2   3      1    20
CEE    2    •    •     6     •      1   •      •    10
Africa    3    •    •     •     •      •   •      •      4
Asia/Oceania    3    1    1     1     •      3   •      •    10
Latin America    3    •    3     •     •      •   1      •      8
Rest of World    2    •    •     •     •      •   •      •      4
World  42    3  16   10     5    11   8      4  100
1960 Total World Exports:  $128 billion
1995
Western Europe  31    1    3     2     1      3   1      2    45
Japan    2    •    3     •     •      4   •      •      9
North America    3    1    6     •     •      3   2      •    16
CEE    2    •    •     1     •      •   •      •      3
Africa    2    •    •     •     •      •   •      •      2
Asia/Oceania    3    3    4     •     •      7   •      1    18
Latin America    1    •    2     •     •      •   1      •      4
Rest of World    1    1    •     •     •      1   •      •      3
World  43    6  18     3     2    19   5      4  100
1995 Total World Exports:  $4,890 billion
Source: For 1960, own calculations from UN trade database. For 1995, own calculations from
WTO Annual Report, 1996.
Note: • indicates trade flow is less than 0.5 percent of world exports.
In the matrix for 1995, Western Europe is the only region with a full row and a full
column, where cells in the matrix are left blank if the percentage of world trade in that
cell is less than 0.5 percent. This is true neither of America nor Japan. This would make
it appear that Europe is the natural champion of the cause of the WTO (more on this
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below). Africa exports to Western Europe only and imports only from that region, and
the same thing is largely true for CEE. Another fact about the latter is that trade within
CEE has fallen from 6 percent of world trade in 1960 to 1 percent in 1995. Africa’s and
CEE’s focus on Western Europe is not a positive phenomenon, but we must remember
that CEE has started on its new regime only very recently.
If we look for evidence of polarization, we see that African countries in both 1960 and
1995 did not trade much within their own region, but largely with Western Europe. This
is why Africa is not interested in the WTO negotiations, but wants preferential access to
the EU market. But African trade represents only 3 percent of the EU’s total. Similarly,
CEE in 1995 was totally focused on Western Europe, after focusing on intraregional
trade in 1960, while it remains a minor market for the EU. For Latin America, we see
the same trade polarization, in this instance with respect to North America.
However, matters are different in Asia. In the 1960s, many Asian countries still had
colonial ties with Western Europe, so trade focused on that region. Asian intraregional
trade increased between 1960 and 1995, but Asian trade is now spread evenly across
Western Europe, Japan, and North America. This is not surprising, since these countries
are industrializing, so that is normal for them to trade with each other; when they
specialized in primary commodities, they tended to trade with the North. The even
distribution of Asian trade may explain why these countries supported a multilateral
trade environment in the Uruguay round negotiations.
Does the intensification of internal trade within the EU reflect hostility toward the
outside world? There is intensification of trade within regions, which we would expect
given existing integration schemes. Indeed, intra-EU trade as a percentage of extra-EU
trade rose from 55 percent in 1960 to 176 percent in 1996. The story is more or less the
same for primary products and manufactured goods. Due to the CAP, the increase is
even larger (from 41 percent to 234 percent) for food products; there has also been a
larger than average increase for road vehicles. The smallest increase is for textiles and
clothing.
From a policy standpoint, NAFTA and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are
based on deregulation and liberalization, both internally and worldwide. In contrast, EU
trade policy is highly discriminatory, contradicting the WTO principle of non-
discrimination. The EU discriminates by signing separate agreements with individual
countries and regions (e.g., Malta, Turkey, Israel, North Africa, the Middle East, the
Europe Agreements, the Lomé Convention, the GSP). It also discriminates sectors for
given trading partners in its antidumping procedures.
However, this is only part of the story. The 1992 program provides for a massive
amount of internal deregulation and liberalization. The European Commission
subsequently took the initiative to extend these moves beyond the EU in such areas as
banking, insurance, and telecommunications, allowing countries from outside the
grouping to compete on its markets.
To conclude, we can say that trading blocs are emerging in Africa and CEE and within
the EU to the extent that intra-EU trade has intensified. But this is not the case with
respect to policy-making in the EU, NAFTA, or APEC. Furthermore, multination
companies are keeping the world market as open as possible.
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Discussion of Previous Two Papers
In the discussion, one participant noted that, while he agreed with the papers’ policy
conclusions on not ignoring economic relations with non-European countries, Central
and Eastern Europe’s high trade intensities with Western Europe and within its own
region were explicable based on the standard gravity model. Trade intensity takes into
account only the size and level of economic development from among that model’s
explanatory variables. The flowering of trade between CEE and the EU has been
fostered by the agreements signed between them, especially the Europe Agreements.
Accordingly, there is no evidence of CEEC leaders having made any policy mistakes.
The rejoinder was that the EU has paid a price in terms of lost opportunities for trade
and investment, especially in Asia, for its preoccupation with the single market, and that
CEECs should not make the same mistake.
Looking at the data on trade shares from a different angle, it emerges that the only
bilateral relationship in which Western Europe raised its share between 1960 and 1995
was intraregional trade. This may imply increased regionalization. If so, it could be
explained by market factors (i.e., more specialization within Europe), which would be
positive, or by institutional ones, which may be unfortunate (if it is the result, e.g., of the
CAP). It might also reflect a decline in competitiveness on a global scale, working
either through being crowded out of other markets or being forced to build up the local
market because of an inability to compete globally.
One discussant argued that new members of the EU will be very restrained in voicing
their opinions in the European Commission on the choice between regionalism and
globalism. In reply, it was noted that new members will have an impact on the
Commission’s decision-making; the presentation by Widgrén showed that the
Commission’s power is increasing, which will have implications for this issue. In any
case, previous fears about Fortress Europe proved to be unjustified.
The discussion turned to the question of whether with enlargement, the EU will not
inevitably become more self-absorbed. It was noted that it was natural for the massive
single market program to be the main focus of attention in 1992. However, the
Commission realized very quickly that if the EU was to maintain its relative position in
the world in terms of income per capita, it must have extensive trade and investment
relations beyond its own borders.
The main impetus for this view came not from politicians, but from the roundtable of
industrialists from such companies as Philips, Shell, Unilever, and Siemens. In fact,
there were two strains of thought in the grouping. Philips held that the single market
meant that European producers should be able to first sell their products on a sheltered
market and then go outside the EU once those products were established. The other
view, which was embraced by Unilever and Shell and which won the day, held that
Europe should not be a protected market. There has also been a change in the EU’s
attitude toward foreign trade over the years, as a mercantilistic view espoused by the
French has been eclipsed by views more favorable to free, nondiscriminatory trade
relations favored, for example, by the U.K. and Sweden. But there are still battles to be
fought over such products as cars and bananas and over the CAP.
Multinational companies have played a big role in shaping the internal market; such
corporations are more favorably disposed toward having an open world market than
politicians, who tend to be more nationalistic. Individual nations often come up with
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policies that tend to fragment the world market, examples being non-tariff barriers and
trade-related investment measures. The multinational companies avoid import barriers
by “tariff jumping” or in other ways, and if a country requires too much of them in
terms of local sourcing, they locate in a neighboring land. They also need a certain
guidance, and the OECD is dealing with that issue through the drafting of new
agreements governing their conduct.
One discussant noted that a major reason why East Asian trade was more diversified
than that of Latin America or Africa is that East Asia has grown more rapidly; trade
diversification can be viewed as something of a normal good, especially in view of the
high transactions costs of diversifying one’s trade relations. The view that CEECs
should not ignore the rest of world has disturbing policy implications if it means that
those countries should devote scarce resources to sending trade delegations to distant
markets. The extent of the diversification a country’s trade relations may be a function
of fundamental economic variables and not very sensitive to policy measures.
In response, it was observed that East Asia’s trade success was related to policy matters,
including those promoting macroeconomic stability, high domestic savings and
investment, and human capital formation. Those factors that led to success at the
regional level in East Asia triggered success at the global level. Moreover, belonging to
a trade bloc is less important than having sound economic policies, as we observe from
the greater success of some EU members, such as the U.K. or the Netherlands, in
attracting Japanese FDI than others.
The discussion then focused on the relevance of certain trends in world trade, such as
the growing roles of trade in services and intra-firm trade, for CEECs. Although these
tendencies have probably not yet made themselves felt strongly in the region, they
demonstrate several important points. The prevalence of intra-firm trade – by one
estimate such trade makes up about half of world trade – shows that trade and FDI are
no longer substitutes. The unhappy experience of Latin America, which tried to attract
FDI by erecting trade barriers, relative to East Asia, where they have long appreciated
the complementarity between trade and FDI, demonstrates this point.
Moreover, FDI and intra-firm trade are related in complicated ways. For example, in
CEE we do not know to what extent U.S. investors are importing from their subsidiaries
in Western Europe. This depends on whether the West European subsidiaries are
investing or the capital is coming directly from the U.S. In any case, the sequencing that
used to hold in earlier times – that trade came first, then once the local market had
become difficult to maintain or was too small or because of high tariffs, comes FDI – no
longer applies. Investors come to small CEE countries for sourcing purposes, and
sourcing means that FDI comes first and is followed by trade. In any case, it seems that
market forces are more important than political ones in determining trade patterns,
although we should not underestimate the latter, as demonstrated by the EU’s special
treatment of the so-called sensitive sectors.
Trade in services has grown rapidly throughout the OECD. With rising per capita
incomes, services have become a larger part of the economy. Furthermore, with
technological improvements in transportation and communications and the spread of
international finance, trade in services tends to grow faster than their production.
It was remarked that Western Europe’s large share of world trade is mostly a scale
phenomenon, that is, it is because its GDP is so much larger than other regions’. The
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response was that the U.S. is not very different in scale, and yet has relatively
insignificant trade volumes with many regions of the world, which cannot be said of
Western Europe.
One serious issue is what will become of trade between countries joining the EU and the
former Soviet republics, especially Russia and Ukraine. Estonia’s signing of a free trade
agreement with Ukraine, which governed a tiny amount of trade, caused great concern
in Brussels, even before Estonia had begun accession negotiations.
The extent of regionalization and globalization varies greatly across the main
commodity groups. Within the EU, for agricultural commodities, there is a higher than
average degree of regional concentration of trade (due to the CAP), while for CEE and
Latin America, but not East Asia, machinery has this characteristic. At present, intra-
CEFTA trade is concentrated on raw materials, chemicals, and intermediate products,
and most machinery production is sold to Western Europe, which may be seen as a
favorable pattern.
7.3 Globalization and Regionalization in Central and Eastern
Europe26
This paper presents a larger, more politically oriented picture of globalization and
regionalization, two processes that will in the future create the context for EU
enlargement. The EU is not synonymous with Europe, but the enlargement process is
reducing the gap between the two. That process is now moving in an eastward direction,
after the southwestern, western, and northern enlargements that occurred previously.
Indeed, the issue of enlargement is now also the issue of Europe’s eastern border.
We analyze here not so much the formal accession process, but the underlying reasons
for the “urge to merge” that is prevalent now all over the world. Indeed, there are few
countries that are not involved in some type of integration scheme, with even Burma on
its way into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), although North
Korea remains an exception in this regard. There are also various schemes in Europe
that cut across EU lines, such as the Council of Baltic Sea States CEFTA (after some of
its members accede to the EU).
We are witnessing a new regionalism, which can only be understood in the context of
the ongoing globalization process, and which is in fact a reaction to globalization. In an
earlier presentation, it was stated the EUREKA favored globalization, so that European
firms could compete with firms from all other the world, particularly Japan and the U.S.
Technological globalization may be a good thing, and in any case it is inevitable, since
technological secrets cannot be maintained for long.
But economic and financial globalization, especially the latter, have been under
considerable debate, largely as a result of the East Asian crisis. Relatedly, there are
those who believe that economic restructuring without regard for its social
consequences may be counterproductive, even in terms of economic criteria in the long
run. The current vulnerability of the Polish and Estonian peasantry is a case in point.
                                                
26This section summarizes the presentation of the paper “Globalization, Regionalism, and the
Europeanization of Europe” by Björn Hettne.
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We will probably see a good deal of social and ethnic unrest in East and Southeast Asia
following the (necessary) restructuring of their economic and financial systems.
Based on the work of the Hungarian economic historian Karl Polányi, in his The Great
Transformation, we can argue that the logic of the market, its tendency to disembed the
economy from society, causes social and political turbulence. A period of market
expansion, what Polányi called the “first movement,” is followed by one of political
retrenchment, which he termed the “second movement.” Together, these two
movements form the Great Transformation, which covers much of twentieth century
history – the free trade era, the Great Depression, and the many types of political
interventions that followed, including communism, fascism, and social democracy.
After World War II, we have seen a new phase of market expansion, under the Bretton
Woods system, which might be called the “compromise of embedded liberalism,”
meaning internationally free trade and domestic regulation based on Keynesian theory.
Globalization started with the breakdown of this compromise in the early 1970s. Today,
the distinction between the domestic and international economies no longer makes
sense. Nonetheless, there will be different types of political reactions to this trend, and
some of them will be ugly and destructive.
Other types of political reactions will perhaps lay the groundwork for a second great
transformation, a new disembedding of the global market into some kind of political
framework. One aim of that transformation would be to reduce the gap between the
financial economy (what Susan Strange calls “casino capitalism”) and the real economy.
Another would be to provide shelter for the Polish peasant and other vulnerable groups,
which represent a very large percentage of the population in many countries (e.g.,
China’s 100 million-strong “floating population,” whose ranks will probably increase
because of the current Asian crisis).
An important component of current trends is the new regionalism, which is occurring in
a multipolar world, that fact being the main difference between it and the old
regionalism. The latter was deformed by the Cold War, which had a strong impact on
regional cooperation in most regions, as we saw the U.S./Soviet division in Europe, East
Asia, and Africa, among other regions. World regions are now developing
spontaneously and from below. There are more actors involved than nation states, and
the regions are multipurpose. It is no longer simply a matter of trade and economic
cooperation, but also cooperation on ecological issues, peacekeeping, conflict
intervention, and so on. In the long run, these new regions may even develop into
“region-states,” which may be more similar to modernized empires than nation states.
So far, Europe, with its Maastricht project, is the only example of this tendency.
We can thus speak of a “post-Westphalian” political rationality, which may become more
prevalent in the next century. The 350th anniversary of the Peace of Westphalia will be
celebrated in 1998 and we can say the Westphalian era has ended. We can divide the post-
Westphalian world into 17 unequal regional groupings, which can be designated as core,
intermediate, or peripheral. Some of these groupings are formally institutionalized, while others
are only embryonic. Regionalism can be seen as merely something that occurs in a given
geographical area because, for example, of close networking. Such is the case in East Asia,
where there is no formal regional grouping, but Japanese capital and Chinese entrepreneurship
provide the basis for ever deeper integration.
The core regions, which are rich and powerful, influence the rest of the world. The
intermediate ones approach the core in terms of economic policy, political regime, and
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political stability, while the peripheral ones are characterized by underdevelopment and
civil war. The core regions are North America (as symbolized by NAFTA), Europe
(basically the EU), and East Asia.
The intermediate regions are CEE (waiting for EU membership); MERCOSUR (which
stands for Mercado Común del Sur, and may become part of a continental free trade
area, although cultural problems may lead to polarization between it and NAFTA); the
ASEAN states (which is growing into one region with East Asia); the European Pacific
(Australia and New Zealand) and the South Pacific, both of which are being drawn by
Japanese capital into the larger East Asian economic space; and coastal China, which
has applied similar economic policies to East Asia and has perhaps the most impressive
growth rate in Asia. Regions on the border between intermediate and peripheral include
southern Africa, because of the role of South Africa and the peace in the former
Portuguese colonies after ten or twenty years of civil war; and North Africa, which
would be close to becoming part of a Mediterranean economic space if not for the
Algerian problem.
Among the peripheral regions, we may number the Commonwealth of Independent
States, which has great potential to move upward as soon as its internal problems are
solved, which should happen within five to ten years; the Balkans, a hopeless case, with
a lack of development and an absence of cooperation; the Middle East, because of the
absence of progress in the peace process; the nations of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, which is peripheral because of the lack of cooperation between
India and Pakistan, which keeps the entire region in a low position; Indochina plus
Burma, a region on its way into ASEAN, with only Cambodia on the waiting list,
although Vietnam, Laos, and Burma are not comparable to the other ASEAN members;
inland China, which has missed out modernization and lags for behind the rest of the
country; and the rest of Africa, particularly Central and East Africa and possibly West
Africa.
There is a new political map of the world, with geographical Europe appearing on all
three structural levels (core, intermediate, and periphery). Politically, Europe is defined
by the economic, political, and minority-rights criteria implied in the process of EU
enlargement. Europe has no explicit cultural definition. But there is also a “real Europe”
that is growing spontaneously out of the new networks arising after the Cold War. From
this standpoint, it makes more sense to integrate sub-regions – such as the Nordic
region, the Baltic region, CEE, the Balkans – rather than individual countries, into the
EU.
In any case, the new larger European landscape will consist of smaller sub-regions. It
does not make sense to leave out a country that forms an integral part of a particular
sub-region (as the EU has done in the case of Slovakia) or to choose one country within
a sub-region (as it has done in the case of Estonia). Norway has voluntarily stayed out
of the EU, but that only means that it is part of the EU economically but cannot
influence its decisions. There seems to be no long-term strategy of enlargement;
unfortunately, we are in a phase of short-sighted national politics.
The answer to this regression to Westphalianism in a post-Westphalian age is to build
the regions from below, through networks and civil societies which transcend nation-
state borders. In the long run, this should also happen in the Balkans, where there is an
extraordinarily low level of regionalism, although there is a European movement even
in Serbia, which should be supported in its fight against fascism.
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Discussion of Previous Paper
In the discussion that followed the paper, it was pointed out that there is a fear in the EU
and in CEE that regionalization will lead to fragmentation, not only in a geographical
context, but also in a cultural, functional one. Economic developments are moving
much faster than political and institutional ones: the CEECs are already highly
integrated at the micro level into EU economic structures, if one looks at trade shares,
FDI, or tourism flows, but such tendencies are much less clear in institutionalized
politics. Generally speaking, regionalism can be interpreted either positively (i.e.,
bringing smaller units together) or negatively (i.e., breaking up larger blocs), both of
which are occurring in Europe.
In response, it was noted that regionalization implies both integration and disintegration,
since as one builds new structures one destroys the previous formations. Mercantilists
built the modern nation-state, thereby destroying many local feudal structures. In
Europe, one can distinguish between macro-regionalization and micro-regionalization,
with the former referring to the overall process of enlargement. At the same time, there
are possibilities for new interactions between various sub-national regions, a
development that will occur at the expense of the nation-state. Micro-regionalism is a
practical and nonviolent process of transformation, which can be contrasted with
“morbid Westphalianism,” an ethno-national trend evident in the Balkans.
Another discussant noted that the Westphalian approach is Euro-centered; in other parts
of the world, there are quite different trends. In any case, the Peace of Westphalia
marked the establishment of colonial regimes, introducing a long period during which
great empires ruled the world. Today, in many parts of the world the end of the
Westphalian order has seen the establishment of many small states. By one count, there
are about 5,000 ethnic groups in the world that could claim national independence on
the basis of the UN charter. Relatedly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the last
great empire, has perhaps created the danger of the emergence of new regional powers,
around which a number of client states cluster. If such happens, it would mark a return
to the traditional power structure of the world.
In response, it was acknowledged that the Westphalian notion is Euro-centric, but added
that with decolonization the entire world was organized into nation-states, which needed
to defend themselves and create alliances, notions that had arisen in Europe. Many of
the nation-states created from the old colonial areas were artificial, leading to a second
liberation in many countries in South Asia and Africa, where the elites who had
inherited the colonial states are being challenged. But this process will not result in
more than a handful of new states, because the level of integration on the global level
has reached such a point that a further creation of myriad new states would defeat its
own purposes. On the emergence of new regional powers, we can only hope that these
will be benevolent hegemons, as seems to be the case with South Africa. India could
play that role in South Asia, as could Argentina and Brazil in South America, but there
are also such cases as Iraq.
A discussant remarked that in the current debate on globalization, the power centers –
the EU, the U.S., and Japan – are displaying the most concern that economic integration
will reduce their economic welfare. Several decades ago, there was concern about
exploitation of the periphery by the core, so the anxiety about such integration occurred
in the periphery. Today, the rich part of the world fears that its wage levels or wage
structure will be changed by trading freely with weaker partners.
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Another discussant noted that when the nation-state was integrating internally, it had a
tendency to be less cooperative with the outside world and to be more aggressive. More
recently, when the EU was strengthening itself internally, it became more cooperative,
at least in the medium term, with the rest of the world. In response, it was noted that
countries in the intermediate position tend to favor an open regionalism. However, for
ones on the periphery, there remains a need for cooperative schemes of infrastructural
development and industrial policy, of the same kind that was born in the nation-state in
the 19th century. In the latter, there is a need for a temporary exclusion from the rest of
the world to build up an institutional base; otherwise, these countries will become
clients to various regional powers.
Another question concerned the identity of the actors in the new regionalism, whether
they will be the state, multinational companies, the business sector, or international
organizations. In reply, it was observed that the most that could be said at the moment is
that there will be more actors than in the old days. Today, there is a different kind of
networking, with business groups and various movements organized in regional
contexts. The state tends to be conservative and slow-moving compared to these other
actors.
A discussant observed that in the process of accession to the EU, the state will be in the
strongest bargaining position relative to the European Commission. However, much of
CEFTA trade is being driven by the multinational companies, a tendency that will likely
be even more pronounced after CEECs join the EU. It was reiterated that what makes
the new regionalism new is that it is occurring in a multipolar world (after the Cold
War); that it is a multipurpose, multidimensional process, covering ecology, security,
and so on. For instance, MERCOSUR is a distinctive regional organization because it is
a political project which emphasizes security and maintaining regional credibility by
facilitating political stability. A discussant noted, however, that purely in economic
terms, it was unclear that MERCOSUR really exemplified an open regionalism.
Another participant noted that, even in economic terms, current tendencies toward
greater regional integration display qualitatively new features.
* * *
In closing the conference, András Inotai noted that the next enlargement of the EU will
be the first to take place in a changed global environment. All earlier enlargements were
largely intra-European affairs. This means that the EU has to take into account global
challenges that it did not have to deal with previously. For the applicant countries, it
means that they face a threefold challenge: those arising from the global context; those
arising from accession; and those arising from various aspects of regional cooperation.
The future of Europe and the success of accession will substantially depend on whether
these three requirements can be put into a viable framework. If this project fails, the
consequences will be a loss of global competitiveness, missing out on accession, or an
undermining of regional cooperation, which would have major macroeconomic
implications for everyone concerned. Global challenges are occurring on two levels, the
institutional level and the business level. A shift between these two challenges is taking
place, a fact that applicant countries must take into account in their accession strategies,
which is no easy task.
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APPENDIX I: Workshop Program
Program for the Workshop on
European Union vs. the Rest of the World:
Complements or Substitutes for Central and Eastern Europe?
4–6 December 1997
Hotel Mercure Buda, 1013 Budapest
Organized jointly by IIASA, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Hungarian Strategic Task Force for European Integration
Thursday, 4 December
14:00 Opening of the Workshop
14:15 Introduction: János Gács and András Inotai
14:20 Latest Developments in the Process of Accession — Updates from the Applicant
Countries — Chair: János Gács
Czech Republic: Petr Pomezný
Bulgaria: Rossen Rozenov
Hungary: András Inotai
Lithuania: 5DP QDV9LOSLãDXVNDV
14:50 Questions and Discussion
15:20 Coffee Break
15:40 SESSION I: Common External Tariff, Common Commercial Policy
and Centralized Trade Negotiations
Mika Widgrén: The Expected Implications of EU Enlargement on
Common Policies Such as Trade Policy
16:00 Discussion
16:15 Zden N'UiEHN Common External Tariff and Domestic Adjustment in the
CEECs
16:35 Discussion
16:50 SESSION II: The Future of Bilateral Relations and Regional
Cooperation/Integration Crossing EU Lines
Katharina Helmstedt: Effects of EU Membership on Austria’s Trade with Non-
EU Countries, Such as Japan, South-East Asian and Middle
East countries
17:30 Discussion
18:00 End of Discussion
18:30 Reception in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism
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Friday, 5 December
09:00 Latest Developments in the Process of Accession — Updates from the Applicant
Countries — Chair: Jacob Kol
Estonia: Katrin Kanarik
Latvia: Inna Šteinbuka
Slovenia: Andrej Kumar
Poland: :áDG\VáDZ3LVNRU]
Slovakia: Jarko Fidrmuc
09:30 Questions and Discussion
10:00 SESSION II: The Future of Bilateral Relations and Regional
Cooperation/Integration Crossing EU Lines (continuation)
Katrin Kanarik: The Future of Regional Integration Crossing EU Lines —
An Estonian Perspective
Rossen Rozenov: Bulgaria's Trade and Development in Case Some East
European (CEFTA Member) Countries Become EU
Members Earlier than Bulgaria
10:40 Discussion
11:10 Coffee Break
11:40 SESSION III: FDI – The Effects of NATO and EU Membership on
Investments from Non-EU Investors
Matija Rojec: The Prospects of FDI (from EU and Non-EU Countries) in
the Countries Joining EU and NATO
Tsuneo Morita: Past Experience and Expectations with Respect to EU
Enlargements from the Point of View of Japanese Investors
12:20 Discussion
12:50 Lunch
14:40 SESSION IV: Integrated European Capital Market and the Impact of the
Euro Chair: Petr Pomezný
Nuno Cassola: The Portugese Experience with Capital Flows After
Accession
15:00 Discussion
15:20 SESSION V: Technological Cooperation: EU Programs Limited to
Europe or  Broader Schemes?
Benno Schmidt-Küntzel: The Opening up of EUREKA to Globalization and to the
Request of European Industry
15:40 Discussion
16:00 Coffee Break
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16:30 SESSION VI: Agriculture
:áDG\VáDZ3LVNRU] Chance and Challenges of EU Accession: Poland’s
Farming Sector Perspective
Judit Kiss: Is CEFTA a Substitute or Supplement to EU Accession?
The Case of Agricultural Trade
17:10 Discussion
17:40 End of Session
19:00 Dinner
Saturday 6, December
09:30 SESSION VII: Will There Be a Tripolar World? New Regionalism and the
Eastern  Enlargement — Chair: András Inotai
Peter Nunnenkamp: Trends and Future Prospects of Trade and FDI within
Europe and between Europe, America and Asia
Jacob Kol: Are Trading Blocks in the World Economy Emerging? —
Empirical Data and Economic Policy Evaluation
10:10 Discussion
10:40 Coffee Break
11:10 Björn Hettne: Globalization and Regionalization in Central and Eastern
Europe
11:30 Discussion
11:50 Concluding General Discussion
13:00 End of Workshop and Lunch
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